A sourced parent guide · Full report

PPS Rightsizing & School Closures

A Sourced Guide for Parents

NewAdded November 17: The superintendent's final recommendation, checked against PPS's own packet: a staffing target met without closures, savings PPS has already cut by 20% in a revised memo, a state seismic grant at risk at Marysville, and a size rule the west side doesn't follow

Portland Public Schools may close up to 14 schools under a plan it calls "rightsizing," with a school board vote expected on December 15, 2026. The enrollment decline behind it is real. But the case for closing schools to fix it is not: by the district's own account this isn't a budget solution, there's no track record of closures delivering the better-resourced schools they promise, and the specific numbers that would let families judge the plan — building capacity, class sizes, the staffing model — still haven't been released. This guide walks through what PPS is proposing, why it says it's necessary, and what the evidence actually shows. Every factual claim links to a public source so you can check it yourself. It's a work in progress and will be updated as more becomes public.

Two things stand out. First, the cost falls unevenly: North and Southeast Portland, the areas with the most small, under-enrolled schools, absorb 10 of the 14 proposed closures, and nearly every dual-language program being broken up serves immigrant and multilingual families on the city's north and east sides. Second, this isn't a homegrown fix for a Portland problem — the same closures, pitched in the same language, are moving through district after district facing the same demographic math. You don't need that national context to see the raw deal Portland is getting, but it helps explain why the district reached for this particular answer, and it shows what the approach has and hasn't delivered elsewhere. This isn't a fight for any one school; it's about what public education owes its most underserved students across the city.

This is the whole guide on one page. For a shorter read, see the summary version.


Contents

What PPS is proposing#

"Rightsizing" is PPS's term for closing and consolidating schools, along with changing attendance boundaries and moving programs, in response to declining enrollment. PPS rightsizing page

In early October 2026, PPS released two scenarios plus a status-quo option. Scenario A closes 14 schools; Scenario B closes 11. PPS scenarios Irvington Elementary closes under both A and B. Grant–McDaniel regional summary Under Scenario A, the district's regional breakdown splits Irvington's students three ways: elementary students to Beverly Cleary, middle-graders to Beaumont Middle School, and high-schoolers to Grant, with Beverly Cleary's attendance boundary expanding to take in the Irvington neighborhood. PPS rightsizing dashboard

In October, the superintendent said she was "leaning into" Scenario B, which she said still puts "70% of our students or above in schools that are sustainable" (PPS's own summary says 73%). OPB, Oct 16 · PPS: district-wide scenarios Her final recommendation came out on November 12: 10 elementary schools close over two years (see "The final recommendation, checked").

The number has grown over the year, from "5 to 10" schools last spring to "up to 20" by late summer. KGW · OPB

The process runs in phases, ending in a final board vote scheduled for December 15, 2026: PPS timeline · OPB

  1. Exploration (Fall 2025–Winter 2026)
  2. Plan and form advisory committee (Winter 2025–26)
  3. Develop and share scenarios (Spring–Fall 2026)
  4. Superintendent's recommendation (Fall 2026)
  5. Board vote (December 2026)
  6. Changes take effect (Fall 2027)

The final recommendation, checked against PPS's own numbersNew#

The superintendent's recommendation is the plan the board will actually vote on. It arrived on November 12 as a 62-page memo with 18 attachments: closure reports for each school, impact summaries for every school that changes, a staffing model, a savings table, sample bus routes, and an equity impact statement. PPS: Superintendent's recommendation and attachments, Nov 17 board meeting This is the most PPS has published, and it's enough to check the plan. Page numbers below refer to the memo unless noted.

What it does. Ten elementary schools close, phased over two years:

Fall 2027 Students go to Fall 2028 Students go to
Beach Chief Joseph (Spanish immersion to César Chávez) Lewis Duniway
Buckman Abernethy and Sunnyside (arts program ends) Marysville Arleta and Kelly
Creston Atkinson (Deaf and Hard of Hearing program to Glencoe) Rose City Park Scott (Vietnamese immersion to Vestal)
Irvington Beverly Cleary (in the Irvington building for 2027-28) Woodmere Whitman
Peninsula Rosa Parks
Sabin King

The East Sylvan building also closes, with Odyssey moving to Forest Park. Seven K-8 schools become K-5 schools, Spanish immersion shrinks from nine elementary sites to four, and Mandarin from three to two. Sellwood Middle, James John, Maplewood, and Stephenson come off the list. Five of the 10 closing schools are Title I schools: Beach, Buckman, Peninsula, Marysville, and Woodmere. PPS: Title I schools, 2026-27 PPS says 5,641 K-8 students, 19%, would change schools or programs. (pp. 1–2, 22–41, 46)

1. Closing schools doesn't save school jobs

This is the number that matters most, and it's in a section titled "Methodology & Important Caveats." To compare the plan with doing nothing, PPS applied the same cutting rules to both, counting positions "before add-backs and reinvestments are applied." Without closures, the model cuts 277.5 school positions; with them, 308.5. "The stated target is 223 FTE to address our projected $65 million budget deficit. Both items are over reduced to allow for the opportunity for some reinvestment." (p. 50)

Read that carefully: PPS's own model reaches its staffing target without closing a school. Without closures, it cuts 54.5 more positions than the target, leaving room to add some back. Closures aren't what gets PPS to its number. With them, the model cuts 31 more positions before add-backs. PPS says the closures free about 22 positions to reinvest, 15 to 20 of them in schools taking in students, and move 8.5 to Title I elementary schools that receive students. It doesn't publish the net for either version after add-backs. (pp. 50–51) In the school-by-school table, the difference is 41.5 positions out of about 2,200. PPS says it didn't change class-size ratios in either version; its weighted average class size is 27.1 students without closures and 27.4 with them, before reinvestments. (pp. 51–54) The memo credits the closures with "about 75 FTE in programmatic efficiencies," (p. 50) a figure its own tables don't reconcile with a 31-position difference.

Which positions these are. The model counts staff assigned to school buildings. It leaves out special education, multilingual services, Title I, and Measure 98. (p. 50) The memo never breaks the cuts down by job: how many are classroom teachers; arts, PE, and library teachers; counselors; assistants; or administrators. It does say the closures' cuts include 10.5 principal and administrative assistant positions, with the rest coming from "programmatic efficiencies." With class-size ratios unchanged, merging schools most likely means fewer homeroom classes and fewer specialists split across buildings: fewer teaching positions for about the same number of students. PPS describes it as a way "to protect core classroom instruction." (pp. 50–51) The board should see the job-by-job numbers before it votes. And these are only part of the cuts. The $65 million is split between $41.9 million from schools and districtwide student supports and $23.1 million from central office and building operations, with "central office budget decisions" coming first. PPS: Financial Update, Nov 17 The packet gives no districtwide count of positions. On November 2, the superintendent said up to 450 could be cut. KPTV, Nov 2 For teachers at closing schools, the contract adds a second cut: they compete by seniority for whatever positions remain, and those who don't get one are "unassigned" (see "What it means for teachers and staff").

The closure savings themselves come from school jobs. Each closure report says the savings include "administrative, custodial, and office staffing" at the closing school. PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C) The board has been told the choice is closures or deeper cuts to schools. By PPS's own model, the cuts to schools happen either way; closing buildings doesn't spare them.

Administration first, as the Governor said. At her post-election press conference on November 6, Gov. Tina Kotek said the district "needs to do everything they possibly can to cut administrative costs and other things before they talk about closing schools," and should be "reducing all other costs before they start impacting the student experience." Gov. Tina Kotek: post-election press conference, Nov 6 (video) · KATU PPS's plan runs the other way. Its budget targets take $41.9 million from schools and districtwide student supports and $9.6 million from the central office, with $13.5 million from building operations. PPS says "Central Office budget decisions come first," but its budget recommendations aren't due to the board until January 12, 2027, four weeks after the closure vote. PPS: Financial Update, Nov 17 The board is being asked to close schools before it has seen what PPS will cut from its own offices.

2. The savings are small, the table doesn't add up, and none of it goes to the deficit

The memo projects "net recurring savings" of "about $10.2 million across both years," and says "about $7.1 million remains to reinvest in receiving schools, transportation and transition supports." (p. 2) Four days after releasing the memo, on November 17, the day the superintendent presented it to the board, PPS posted a revised version with a corrected savings table: $5,654,819 left to reinvest, 20% less than the first version. The summary on page 2 wasn't updated and still says $7.1 million. PPS: Superintendent's recommendation, revised Nov 17 (v1.1) (pp. 2, 49–50, and change log) These are the superintendent's estimates, and even taken at face value, $5.65 million is 8.7% of the $65 million gap. It's also earmarked: the memo reserves it for receiving schools and buses, not the deficit.

The table behind those figures had problems, and PPS has fixed only some of them. (pp. 49–50)

  • The first version left out costs it listed. The original table counted $1.02 million to move programs and reconfigure grades, then didn't subtract it from "remaining to reinvest." It didn't subtract its own 5% contingency ($354,464) either, and a formula error dropped $60,000 from year 2. The revised table fixes all three. Its change log says the moving costs "are now included in the remaining to reinvest" and the contingency is now subtracted. (Revised memo, pp. 49–50, change log) The board got a savings figure $1.4 million too high, and the memo's summary still carries it.
  • The bus costs are somewhere else. The table counts $335,000 in net transportation costs. The memo's transportation section says the plan raises bus routes from 122 to 153, "approximately $2.7 million" a year, (p. 55) · PPS: Sample Transportation Routes (Attachment O) and separately estimates the dual-language bus hubs at "a net annual transportation cost increase of $3 million." (p. 55) The revision didn't touch this. PPS hasn't said whether the table includes either figure. If it doesn't, about $3.0 million is left, roughly 4.5% of the gap. (Our arithmetic on PPS's revised table.)
  • The bus numbers point both ways. For nine of the 10 schools, the closure report and the savings table disagree about whether busing costs or saves money. For Sabin, the report says busing costs nothing because "the number of buses remains the same"; the table books a $25,716 cost. Peninsula's report says Rosa Parks goes "from zero to four buses" at "an additional annual cost of approximately $170,000"; the table books it as a $169,511 saving. PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C)
  • Some reports carry another school's numbers. Beach's "cost of school operations" and Rose City Park's "projected overall savings" are both Sabin's figures. None of the reports is signed.

And the bigger driver of the deficit is somewhere else entirely. The board's own 2027 legislative agenda says "approximately two-thirds of the projected $65 million shortfall is directly driven by rising PERS rates," and asks the governor and Legislature "to allocate $500 million from the Education Stability Fund to buy down PERS rates for school districts statewide." PPS Board of Education: 2027 Legislative Agenda That's the same fund families are asking the state to release (see "What we're asking for"). The board and the families opposing this plan want the same money. They disagree about whether to close schools before Salem answers.

3. The plan breaks its own rules

It closes a school that meets PPS's own size line. Rose City Park's closure report projects 391 students next year and 370 by 2031-32, and says so plainly: enrollment "remains above the district's 360 student threshold and does not, on its own, indicate that the school would be unable to maintain stable staffing, programming, or essential student supports." Meanwhile, Scott, which would take its students, drops to 323 in 2027-28 when its Spanish immersion program leaves, below the line. The plan empties one school, then closes a school that meets the standard to refill it. PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C) · PPS: School Impact Summaries (Attachment D)

It keeps open schools smaller than ones it closes. The memo lists James John, Maplewood, Sitton, and Sunrise at "less than 260 students" in 2031-32, with Stephenson "just above at 261," and keeps all five open to "monitor closely." (pp. 42–43) Sitton is projected at 225. Irvington, which closes, is projected at 223. Stephenson stays open because its enrollment "has leveled out," with a rule: "if it declines two years in a row a deeper review will be started." (p. 26) No closing school was offered that rule. Irvington enrolled 259 students both last fall and this fall, more than Portland State forecast four years running. PPS: October 1 enrollment, 2026-27

On the west side, the line doesn't apply at all. Of the 10 neighborhood elementary schools in the Lincoln and Ida B. Wells clusters, Portland State projects eight under 360 students in 2031-32. The plan closes none of them and changes none of their numbers. PSU forecast, Table 5.5

West-side elementary 2031-32 Under 360?
Ainsworth 557 no
Bridlemile 408 no
Markham 347 yes
Chapman 333 yes
Capitol Hill 311 yes
Rieke 311 yes
Hayhurst 266 yes
Stephenson 261 yes
Forest Park 258 yes
Maplewood 247 yes

That's the memo's own figure: 20% of west-side elementary schools at PPS's size line after the plan, the lowest of any region. (p. 47) Skyline K-8 is projected at 177 and Gray Middle at 368, both under the 500 line. Every west-side school under the line is projected smaller than Rose City Park (370), which closes, and four of them (Hayhurst, Stephenson, Forest Park, and Maplewood) are smaller than Beach (287) and Marysville (312), which also close.

This isn't an argument for closing west-side schools. It's that PPS sells the 360 line as the reason for the plan, then says in the same memo that its criteria "were weighed against one another rather than applied as a fixed ranking, and the balance struck differs from one part of the city to another." (p. 14) Where the line bends, the west side gets monitoring now and "a regional boundary review process, starting on the west side," later. (p. 1) The memo's only nod toward a reason is families' concern about the west side's topography, traffic, and limited transit, (pp. 13–14) a real constraint, but not the size rule the plan is built on. Wait, monitor, and study first is exactly what families across the city are asking for. PPS is already doing it in one region.

It closes bigger buildings to fill smaller ones. In seven of the 10 closures, the closing building holds more students than the school taking them in: Beach (607) into Chief Joseph (444), Buckman (633) into Sunnyside (492) and Abernethy (449), Creston (558) into Atkinson (519), Irvington (618) into Beverly Cleary (531), Peninsula (539) into Rosa Parks (499), Sabin (621) into King (584), and Woodmere (465) into Whitman (416). Most receiving schools end up at 91% to 99% of capacity. Whitman ends up at 107%, and its report says it "will likely need to re-evaluate the three classrooms dedicated to early childhood," meaning the PPS Pre-K at a Title I school. Every receiving school's impact summary still marks classroom capacity "Readiness: Yes." PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C) · PPS: School Impact Summaries (Attachment D) That leaves no room if enrollment recovers, the reason PPS gave for keeping Sellwood Middle open: high school modernizations finishing in 2029 "may bring students back into PPS." (p. 25)

It leans on building condition after saying it wouldn't. PPS's measures for the plan say building condition "will not be the primary driver of scenario selection." PPS: Rightsizing Key Performance Indicators (Attachment P) The impact summaries for Beach, Buckman, and Rose City Park lead with "the building needs major repairs." Sabin and Peninsula, two of the closing buildings, are rated in "Fair" condition, the best on the list.

It puts PPS at risk of defaulting on a state contract. In 2024, the state's Seismic Rehabilitation Grant Program, run by Business Oregon, awarded Marysville $2.5 million toward a $7 million seismic retrofit, finished in September 2026. The contract says "the Project must be used for its existing purposes" for 10 years after completion, through 2036. Marysville's own closure report says the same: the grant "requires that the building continue to be used for a public educational program or school until ten years after the project completion date." PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C) The plan closes it as a school in 2028, two years in. A Business Oregon spokesperson told Willamette Week that closing it early "has potential to be considered an event of default," and the contract's most severe remedy is repaying the grant in full. The state says that remedy isn't automatic and it would work with the district. PPS's answer was that grant compliance "would be one of the factors considered in determining preferred uses of district property." Willamette Week, Oct 16 The packet doesn't count that risk, or the $2.5 million, anywhere in the savings.

4. The equity statement argues against the plan

PPS's own equity impact statement is unusually candid. (pp. 46–48)

  • "Multilingual learners carry more of this change than any other group." 26.5% of them would move, against 19.0% of all K-8 students; 21.4% of students in poverty, 20.0% of students with IEPs, and 21.7% of students from historically underserved racial groups.
  • Students move out of 15 of PPS's 32 Title I schools (47%), against 18 of 50 other schools (36%).
  • "The families least represented in the community feedback are the families most affected by the largest program change in the package. Multilingual families are about one in eight students and about one in 50 survey respondents." The board's own Racial Educational Equity Policy commits PPS to treat families of color, "including those whose first language may not be English," as "essential partners in … PPS decision-making." PPS: Policy 2.10.010-P
  • "The Ida B. Wells/Lincoln region contributes no closures and has the fewest schools at sustainable enrollment levels." On the west side, 20% of elementary schools reach PPS's size line, and none closes.

Then it sets a condition: "The analysis supports moving forward on the condition that the commitments are funded, owned and monitored rather than described. Without those commitments, this is an enrollment plan with an equity result." The impact summaries show what has been funded. For SUN community schools, racial-equity partners, and child care, they say continuation "will depend on County, PPS and City budget processes" or "will be dependent on the PPS budget process." PPS: School Impact Summaries (Attachment D) By the statement's own test, this is an enrollment plan.

PPS also attached the equity audit of its last consolidation, and summarized it as having "generally improved enrollment balance." (p. 10) The same audit found that projections overestimated enrollment at 12 of the 20 schools involved, that 39% of staff of color at those schools left them in the first year, and that only 3% of staff trust PPS to handle rightsizing fairly. Before any final decision, it says, PPS should be able to show "whether affected students will move to stronger and better-resourced schools, whether receiving schools are ready, what transition supports will be funded," and "how much the district realistically expects to save." PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation (Attachment E) This packet doesn't show any of those.

5. The numbers that will decide it arrive after the vote

  • The forecast. PPS's staffing projections "will be updated following the release of Portland State University's revised enrollment forecasts in January." (p. 50)
  • The state budget. The Governor's recommended budget comes in early December; the Legislature's appropriations by the end of June. PPS: Financial Update, Nov 17
  • The transition plan. The implementation framework "will be shared with the community in December." PPS: School Impact Summaries (Attachment D)
  • Irvington's year as a temporary site. "If in-process feasibility assessments confirm," with transportation costs "assessed separately." PPS: School Closure Reports (Attachment C)

Nothing in board policy requires a December 15 vote. The boundary policy sets an "intention that all changes be approved no later than January of the calendar year for the following school year." PPS: Policy 4.10.045-P For fall 2027, that's the end of January, after the new forecast and the Governor's budget. For the fall 2028 closures, it's January 2028.

The closure policy, meanwhile, lets the board close a school "only upon a recommendation by the Superintendent accompanied by a School Closure Report which shall contain a full and adequate analysis." The first item it requires is "actual cost per student." PPS: Policy 6.10.030-P The reports give a projected cost instead, contradict the savings table on busing, and answer the policy's equity question with nearly the same paragraph for all 10 schools.

Questions this raises for the board:

  • PPS's model reaches its target of 223 school positions without closing a school, and closures add 31 more before reinvestment. After add-backs, what is the net difference, and how many of those positions are classroom teachers?
  • What administrative and central-office cuts will PPS make, and why won't the board see them before it votes to close schools?
  • How do the 223 to 308.5 school positions break down by job (classroom teachers, specialists, counselors, assistants, administrators), and how many positions will be cut districtwide, central office included?
  • Is the $2.7 million in added bus routes counted in the savings table? If not, what is the net?
  • Which closure does each first-year reconfiguration depend on?
  • Why does Sitton, projected at 225, stay open to be monitored while Irvington, projected at 223, closes?
  • Eight of 10 west-side elementary schools are projected under 360 and none closes, with a boundary review promised later. Why does the rest of the city get closures instead of the same review?
  • Has PPS asked Business Oregon whether closing Marysville in 2028 puts it in default, and could it have to repay the $2.5 million grant?
  • The board has asked Salem for $500 million in pension relief. Why vote before Salem answers?

Why PPS says it's necessary#

The enrollment problem is real, and it's the heart of PPS's case. Enrollment has fallen by about 6,086 students since 2018-19 and is projected to drop another ~3,446 by 2031-32; the district has roughly 43,500 students today. K-12 Dive Portland State's forecast has district enrollment falling about 14% from 2025-26 to 2035-36. PPS Data Explorer Since the pandemic, most of that drop is fewer children; the share of Portland families choosing PPS fell earlier and hasn't recovered (see "Why families leave"). Staffing hasn't kept pace: by the superintendent's count, PPS has about 12% fewer students than in fall 2019 but only about 7% fewer full-time employees than before the pandemic. The Oregonian, June 24

PPS argues that without changes, most schools become too small to staff well. By 2031-32, it projects 37 of 45 elementary schools under 360 students and 13 of 15 middle schools under 500. K-12 Dive Those figures (360 for elementary, 500 for middle and K-8) are the "sustainability thresholds" the plan is built around. Grant–McDaniel regional summary

PPS has put numbers to that claim in its district-wide scenario summary. By the district's "sustainability" measure (enrollment at or above those size lines), if nothing changes, only 26% of schools, holding 48% of students, would be "sustainable" in 2031-32; the two scenarios raise that to 57–67% of schools and 73–80% of students. All of these are projections for 2031-32, not today's counts. PPS: district-wide scenarios · PPS: Oct 20 board meeting PPS's interactive dashboard shows slightly higher Scenario B figures (59% of schools, 74% of students) without explaining the difference. PPS rightsizing dashboard (PPS tracks how full a building is separately, as "efficiently utilized," meaning 70–100% of its capacity. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting) That is the concrete version of the "too small to staff well" case, and it rests entirely on the 360- and 500-student lines examined next: move a line, and the share of "unsustainable" schools moves with it.

The district's dashboard also prices the disruption. Scenario A reassigns 27% of K-8 students to a different school (24% under Scenario B), and the churn lands hardest on the students PPS says it most wants to protect: 31% of students receiving multilingual services are moved under Scenario A, against 27–28% of other groups. PPS rightsizing dashboard By the district's own projection, English-learner families bear more of the move than anyone else.

Where do those thresholds come from? Not from PPS. The 360 and 500 figures are the "prototype school" sizes in Oregon's Quality Education Model (QEM), a state costing tool the Quality Education Commission updates every two years to estimate what a well-funded school system would cost the Legislature. The prototypes are a staffing-and-resource model (class sizes, staff ratios, and positions like a librarian and counselor), not a finding that schools under 360 students underperform; student outcomes enter the QEM only as a broader funding-adequacy link. That matters, because the QEM was built to answer one question: "what does an adequately funded school cost?". But PPS is using it to answer a different one: "how small is too small before we close a school?" The number has a real state pedigree, but nothing in the QEM says a sub-360 school is failing or should be closed, and many smaller schools are staffed and running fine. A reasonable-sounding state figure is being repurposed as a closure trigger it was never designed to be. Oregon QEM issue brief (LPRO, 2023) · OPB

News coverage has reported that PPS officials point to the district's own June 2026 equity audit to explain the 360- and 500-student lines. OPB, Oct 16 That audit contains neither number and sets no school-size standard. What it does say about "well-resourced" schools points the other way: PPS should define them through a staffing model it can fund, and show that students will get more than enrollment numbers that improve "on paper." PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation

The district frames the goal as fewer but better-resourced schools (every school with a full-time librarian, art, and counseling) rather than as budget-cutting. OPB

The size lines decide who's in the pool, not who closes. Even after the closures, many schools stay under the lines. Under Scenario A, 11 of the 39 elementary schools left open would still be under 360 students in 2031-32; under Scenario B, 19 of 42. PPS rightsizing dashboard Three of them would be smaller than schools the plan closes. Sunnyside Environmental becomes a neighborhood-only K-5 school and takes in half of Buckman's neighborhood, yet PPS projects it falling from 376 students in 2027-28 to 235 by 2031-32 as students from outside the neighborhood age out. Sunrise (formerly Lee) is projected at 257, and Forest Park at 259. By PPS's own projections, five elementary schools that Scenario A closes would be larger than all three in 2031-32: Rose City Park (370), James John (352), Marysville (312), Beach (287), and Stephenson (261). PPS rightsizing dashboard

One school moves the wrong way. Jackson Middle is projected at 515 students in 2031-32 if nothing changes, above the 500 line. Under both scenarios it drops to 405, because the Maplewood area's middle-schoolers would go to Gray instead. PPS rightsizing dashboard

What did decide the list. At the October 6 board meeting, PPS's data director gave the reasons school by school: which building more families live closer to (Stephenson, Maplewood, and Creston); the condition of a building and the cost of upgrading it (César Chávez as the Spanish-immersion hub, Beach, Buckman, and Lewis, which has had seismic upgrades but still needs major plumbing and HVAC work); and accessibility, since Sitton stays open over James John because it is "more accessible under the Americans with Disabilities Act." The Oregonian, Oct 7 · OPB, Oct 6

Those are reasonable factors, but they don't line up with how PPS has been spending its bond money. Several schools on the list recently got seismic work: Lewis, Maplewood, Stephenson, and Marysville, whose full retrofit came with obligations to the state agency that helped pay for it. Beach's planned retrofit is expected to cost about $10 million. Willamette Week, Oct 20 State Rep. Thuy Tran says district leaders "explicitly assured" Rose City Park families in January 2026 that the school "was not a candidate for school closure due to its high priority seismic status." OPB, Oct 6 PPS says that if a school slated for seismic work closes, staff will propose other projects, and that decisions about school property will come after the board's final vote. Willamette Week, Oct 20

In fairness, PPS has never said size alone decides; explaining one pairing, staff wrote that "the quantitative model optimizes for building utilization," PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19 and a small school with no nearby building to absorb it may be a poor candidate to close. But that is the point: the 360- and 500-student lines are presented as the reason for the plan, and the plan itself doesn't hold every school to them.

The enrollment forecast: solid for the district, shaky school by school#

Every closure in Scenarios A and B rests on one input: Portland State University's forecast of how many students each school will have in 2031-32. Asked on OPB why PPS wouldn't have an outside auditor check its enrollment data, Superintendent Armstrong said the district doesn't "question those numbers," allowed that "when you get into the individual schools there has been some fluctuation … some schools may be a little over, some may be a little under," and added: "I would love for someone to show us the data where our numbers are off." OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16 So we checked, using Portland State's own reports.

District-wide, the forecast has earned its reputation. Portland State's one-year forecast of total PPS enrollment has a median miss of about 0.5% since 2010, and every forecast since schools reopened in 2022 has stayed within about 1% of what actually happened. PSU forecast, Table 4.4 The decline is real, and this guide doesn't dispute it.

School by school is different, and Portland State doesn't report it. Closures are decided one school at a time, yet the forecast report checks its accuracy only for the district total and by grade; its school-by-school tables carry no error ranges. PSU forecast, Sec. 4.4 So we compared each school's past forecasts with what it actually enrolled, using every Portland State forecast for PPS posted since 2014 (about 4,200 forecasts in all), and confirmed the actual counts against PPS's own enrollment records. PSU forecast archive · PPS 10-year enrollment history Setting aside the COVID years, when nearly every school was over-forecast, here is how far off a school's forecast typically landed. Each cell shows the typical (median) miss, then how many schools in 100 missed by more than 20%, for forecasts made in normal years (2014–19) and since schools reopened (2022–25):

Years out Normal years Since 2022
1 3% · 1 in 100 3% · 0 in 100
2 5% · 2 in 100 6% · 3 in 100
3 6% · 8 in 100 8% · 11 in 100
4 7% · 13 in 100 10% · 17 in 100
6 10% · 22 in 100 not yet measurable

PPS's scenarios are judged six years out. The district measures every school against its size lines in 2031-32, six years past the forecast's latest data. In normal years, a six-year school forecast missed by about 10%, and more than one school in five missed by over 20%. The recent forecasts are, if anything, missing faster.

That margin is wider than many of the calls. In Portland State's newest forecast, 16 schools land within 10% of PPS's size lines (360 students for K-5, 500 for middle and K-8) in 2031-32, and 31 within 20%. For them, "sustainable" or "unsustainable" sits inside the forecast's ordinary miss. Rose City Park, which closes under Scenario A, is projected above the line, at 370. PSU forecast, Table 5.5 · PPS scenarios

The number for the same school keeps moving. Between the 2022 and 2026 editions of the forecast, the 2031-32 projection fell by about a third at Buckman (369 to 239), Lewis (301 to 201), and Woodstock, which would take in Clark's Mandarin program (488 to 325). Rose City Park's rose from 375 to 513, then fell back to 370. Some swings follow boundary changes PPS made in Southeast Portland; others simply reflect a new year of data. Either way, a school's fate can turn on which year's forecast happens to be on the table.

Dual-language programs are shakier still. Forecasts for individual immersion programs, the units PPS proposes to move, missed by a median of 17% four years out, and nearly four in ten missed by more than 20%. In the 2022 edition, Beach's Spanish program was overstated by 49% and Sitton's understated by 32%.

Irvington shows both kinds of miss. Longtime Irvington teachers say Portland State has always overstated the school. For a stretch it did: forecasts published from 2016 to 2021 mostly ran high, and further off than for most schools (the 2021 edition was 27% too high one year out, against 8% for the district). Since 2023 the miss has flipped. The forecast has predicted decline every year while Irvington grew three years running, from 228 students to 259; the 2023 edition's estimate for fall 2025 was 19% low. Irvington is one of only five schools under-forecast in each of the last three one-year forecasts, and the newest edition again has it shrinking, to 223 by 2031-32.

In fairness, a better forecast wouldn't by itself lift Irvington over 360: even 20% more than 223 is 268. The forecast's weakness is an argument about how PPS is deciding more than about any single school. Portland State does produce low and high scenarios, but only for the district as a whole (36,668 to 40,881 students in 2031-32); only the middle scenario is broken out school by school, and PPS treats it as exact. PSU forecast, Tables 5.2–5.5 Before drawing permanent lines through those numbers, the district should publish the range around each school's projection, and Portland State's own record of how its school forecasts have held up. (Our method and full results are available on request.)

Why families leave: PPS asked, and didn't say#

PPS's case rests on there being fewer children, and since the pandemic that is mostly what has happened. Portland State estimates that the share of school-age children in PPS's boundaries who enroll in its schools, which the district calls its "capture rate," actually ticked up after the pandemic, from 74.4% in fall 2019 to 76.6% in 2025. PSU forecast, Sec. 1.2 The bigger loss came earlier. In 2015, PPS enrolled 82.2% of those children, and the share fell nearly eight points before COVID arrived. PPS has won back only a sliver of that: at today's population, the remaining gap is worth roughly 3,000 students. (That last figure is our arithmetic on Portland State's numbers.)

In fairness, births are falling, families have been moving out of the county, and Portland State's director expects those trends to drive the decline ahead. Willamette Week (Aug 2026) The district can't change the birth rate. What it can change is whether families choose it, and why they stopped is exactly what PPS paid to find out.

PPS paid to find out why families leave, and hasn't published the answer. In 2025, PPS commissioned the research firm Symbol LLC to study why families stay and leave: hour-long interviews with 21 parents in August and September, then a fall survey that drew about 2,400 valid responses. The findings were delivered to the board in January 2026, and they became public only when a parent obtained them through a public-records request. Symbol LLC for PPS: Summary Report, Jan 2026 When staff walked the board through enrollment at a March 31 work session, the slide titled "Data Trends & Drivers" showed the decline (down 12% since 2018-19) and no drivers at all, and nothing in the deck mentioned the survey. PPS: March 31 rightsizing deck

What families said:

  • Families who left: of 55 who answered, 45 cited academic quality, 25 cited safety, and 21 said their child's special needs would be better served elsewhere. Of the 41 who said where they went, 34 chose private school.
  • Families still enrolled: 1,412 of 2,356 (60%) said they had considered leaving. Their top reasons were academic quality (74%) and class size (63%), then special-education support (34%) and safety (34%).
  • Why current families chose their school: the most common answer, at 75%, was its neighborhood.

The researchers are candid about the limits, and so should we be. People chose whether to respond, only 55 to 60 of them had left PPS, and Symbol says the results "cannot be generalized to all PPS families" and can't show what caused anyone to leave. Still, they match PPS's own earlier research (in a 2020 district survey, Southeast families with middle-school-age children rated small class size the most important of the qualities it asked about) PPS market study (2020) and Seattle's study of its own decline, where quality of education was the top reason families left and a short trip to school was a top reason they stayed. SPS Enrollment Decline Study (2025)

One destination PPS does count: state-funded virtual charters. Most of the departed families who answered Symbol's survey went to private school, but that was 41 families. PPS does keep its own count of one destination, online charter schools run by other districts, because families must notify PPS when a child enrolls in one. As of November 2026, 1,118 students who live in PPS's boundaries were enrolled in virtual charter schools sponsored by other districts, up from 1,025 at the end of the 2025-26 school year, according to PPS's Enrollment and Transfer Center. The count doesn't include PPS's own online program. PPS Enrollment and Transfer Center, emails to the author, Nov 3–6, 2026 That's about 9% growth in a year when PPS's own enrollment fell 2.7%, from 42,622 to 41,451. PPS: October 1 enrollment, 2026-27 Each of those students takes state school funding with them, to schools that an Oregon Journalism Project investigation found graduate students at far lower rates than brick-and-mortar schools (59% in four years, against 83% statewide), with little state oversight. Willamette Week / Oregon Journalism Project, Nov 3

In fairness, this is a small part of the decline. The 93 added students equal about 8% of this year's drop of 1,171, the two counts were taken at different points in the year, and some of those students were homeschooled or new to Portland rather than leaving a PPS classroom. Most of the decline is still fewer children. But it is one loss the state could address without new money (see "What we're asking for").

Set those answers beside the plan:

  • Class size is the second most common reason current families have considered leaving. The superintendent won't put a class-size cap in writing (see "What the superintendent told Irvington families").
  • The neighborhood school is what current families value most, and it is what a closure takes away.
  • What families asked for isn't what the plan offers. Symbol's highest-priority recommendations were a talented-and-gifted program that actually serves students, honors classes in middle school, classroom aides for students with special needs, and clear discipline policies. PPS defines a "well-resourced school" as stable educators; weekly arts, library, and PE; on-site counseling and nursing; and a full elective rotation. PPS: Sept 1 board deck Those are worthwhile goals, but they are mostly not what families who left said they needed, and none of Symbol's top recommendations requires closing a building.
  • The forecast counts on families coming back, and the scenarios assume none leave. Portland State's forecast, the input to every closure call, assumes PPS's kindergarten capture rises from 74% to 79% by 2028, PSU forecast, Table 5.2 and Portland State has said any recovery depends on PPS improving that number. Willamette Week (Aug 2025) The superintendent says the district also built in further losses from families who opt out after closures. OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16 The numbers PPS has published show no such loss. The dashboard's note on method says that wherever a school or program changed, PPS moved 100% of neighborhood students to their new school, and 80–100% of dual-language students to their program's new home, with the rest assigned to their new neighborhood school. No student leaves PPS. PPS rightsizing dashboard The totals confirm it: in every year from 2027-28 to 2031-32, both closure scenarios project at least as many students in PPS's schools as doing nothing, in fact slightly more (53 to 62). PPS hasn't published the loss it says it built in, or shown where its numbers account for it.

Every closure call rests on that assumption. Each receiving school's projected size, and every "sustainable school" share PPS cites, counts every displaced student as arriving. Enrollment at the closing schools is already falling faster than elsewhere: this fall, before any vote, it fell 5.4% at the 14 schools Scenario A would close (4,258 to 4,030), about twice the 2.6% drop across PPS's K-8 schools. PPS: October 1 enrollment, 2026-27 · PSU forecast, Table 5.5 In San Antonio, a week into the first school year after its closures, about one in five affected students hadn't shown up. TPR So the plan depends on winning families back while it closes the neighborhood schools PPS's own survey says they value most, and it assumes none of the families it moves will go.

One set of answers is missing. The survey asked every group whether redistricting had affected their school choice, and whether it was a factor in leaving or never enrolling; both questions are listed in the report's own appendix. Yet the report's FAQ says the survey "did not include questions specifically about redistricting," and no results appear. Symbol LLC for PPS: Summary Report, Jan 2026 For a district preparing to reassign about a quarter of its K-8 students, those are the answers that matter most. PPS should publish them, along with the full survey.

What the superintendent told Irvington families on October 15 — and what the record shows#

On October 15, Superintendent Kimberlee Armstrong visited Irvington Elementary for an informal "Sip & Spill" community meeting and took questions from families. Several of her answers are worth setting directly against PPS's own published documents, because in two places they point in opposite directions. (Quotes are from the meeting recording; a public official's statements at a public community event are a fair thing to examine.)

"Resourced well" describes a headcount, not what's in the building. Armstrong told the room that consolidation would move the district from "less than 50%" of students in stable schools today to "80% of our students in schools that are stable and resourced well." (The under-50% figure is PPS's projection for 2031-32 if nothing changes, not a count of students today. PPS: district-wide scenarios) That 80% is a real PPS figure, but it is not a measure of resources. It is the district's "percent of students in sustainable schools," and in PPS's usage a "sustainable" school is one whose enrollment clears its size line: 360 students for K-5, 500 for middle and K-8. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The number counts how many students are in a building, not whether it has a librarian, a counselor, or smaller classes. The next day, on the radio, the superintendent drew the same equation herself: "when we say well resourced, we're saying that we're getting to a size of 360." OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16 On that second question PPS's own board deck is explicit: a larger school "does not automatically get a full-time librarian, certain staff, or specific programs." PPS: Sept 1 board deck So the district tells its board those resources are not automatic, and told Irvington families that four in five students would be "resourced well." Both cannot be true. PPS's own communications plan defines the term the other way, by what's inside: "a school with strong academic programs, supports, staffing, and opportunities for students" (see "PPS's own communications playbook").

The "reinvested funds" are smaller than the phrasing suggests. Asked about the budget, Armstrong was candid that closures don't fix it: "It's not for the deficit that we're managing. Regardless of what happens … we're still addressing a $65 million deficit." That matches the record. But she went on to say the money "captured from closures and consolidations will be reinvested back into schools," which frames a meaningful sum moving into classrooms. At the time, PPS had published no savings figure for rightsizing at all, and had told KATU the process is about "student outcomes, not dollars and cents"; a reform-friendly researcher told the same outlet the savings "are not very large," because displaced staff transfer rather than get cut. KATU That $65 million is next year's gap, for 2027-28, the year the first closures would take effect; PPS closed this year's gap of about $56 million last spring, before the year began, largely by eliminating roughly 336 positions. Willamette Week · PPS: Financial Update, Nov 17 Five days later, at the October 20 board meeting, the superintendent gave the first numbers, on a single slide: about $14 million in "operational savings" under Scenario A and about $11 million under Scenario B, enough, she said, to preserve or reinvest the equivalent of about 97 and 76 of the roughly 223 school positions the gap would otherwise cost. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting She called them "planning estimates, not final staffing decisions or guaranteed reinvestments." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting PPS hasn't published any analysis behind them since. So "reinvest those funds" rests on an unsupported estimate of $11–14 million, not broken down and not shown to be net of new costs such as busing, set against a $65 million reduction happening regardless. The reinvestment may be real; its scale is not what the phrasing suggests.

The numbers families asked for arrive after they've been asked to weigh in. Pressed for the class-size and staffing figures behind each scenario, Armstrong said they "will be out in November," because it would be "premature to build a budget" before the election decides the governor who sets the state school fund. That is a defensible reason. It also means families give feedback in October and the board votes December 15, with the concrete numbers landing in the narrow window between — the same "release the staffing model first" gap PPS's own equity auditors flagged after the last consolidation. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit On November 2 she added that details of which positions will be cut likely won't come until January or February, after the board's December vote. KPTV, Nov 2

The next day, on the radio, two more admissions. On October 16, Armstrong took listener questions on OPB's Think Out Loud. Two of her answers sharpen the gap above. (Quotes are transcribed from the broadcast.) OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16

  • She wouldn't put a class-size cap in writing. A parent who teaches in PPS did the arithmetic on air: 360 students is about 60 per grade, which could mean classes of about 20, 24, or 30 depending on how many teachers a school gets. Which does PPS plan for at receiving schools, she asked, and will it put a class-size cap in writing? Armstrong named no ratio and made no commitment to a cap. She said the district would "absolutely want to be" at its current average of 24–25 students, called it "a complicated question," and committed only that her final recommendation in early November "will have the staffing plan attached." That is the number that decides whether a merged school is better or just bigger, and families still don't have it. Class size is also the second most common reason current PPS families say they have considered leaving (see "Why families leave").
  • She explained why the resources can't be promised. Asked why she wouldn't commit to a librarian or more specialists at receiving schools, Armstrong said "one of the reasons why we're not able to get into promises or those commitments is … we're funded per pupil," with the real figures waiting on the state school fund the Legislature adopts in June. In the same interview she said she "absolutely" commits to "reinvesting all of the funds from closures and consolidations directly back into schools," then described what that means: "more resources spread to fewer places." That is the candid version of the pitch. Funding follows students, and closing buildings doesn't add students; it is the same money, concentrated in fewer buildings. As she put it herself, "well resourced doesn't always mean fully staffed." (For how the same reinvestment promise played out in Denver, one of the districts PPS studied, see "The districts PPS chose as models".)

None of this requires assuming bad faith. The point is narrower and checkable: on resources and on savings, the superintendent's spoken reassurances claim more than PPS's own written documents will. Set her sentence beside the district's and the gap is visible without anyone's interpretation.

What it means for teachers and staff#

Whether PPS calls a change a "merger" or a "closure" is not just a matter of tone. For the educators in a building, the label decides who keeps a job, and the district's own contract with the teachers' union spells out how.

Under the Portland Association of Teachers 2023–2026 labor agreement, Article 18.6.9 reads:

"In the event of a school or program closure, professional educators of the open programs keep their positions and the faculty of the closed program will be offered the remaining open positions based on licensure and seniority. Usually there are not enough positions and the remaining professional educators are unassigned." PAT contract, Art. 18.6.9

In plain terms: the receiving school's teachers keep their jobs; the closing school's teachers compete for whatever is left, by seniority, and, by the contract's own admission, there usually isn't enough to go around.

Being "unassigned" is not an automatic layoff, but it means losing your school community and being routed into a vacancy elsewhere in the district through the internal staffing process (Art. 18.6.5); if no position exists, the contract's layoff rules take over, and layoffs run by seniority (Art. 20). The agreement treats "school closure, reconfiguration, conversion, merger, or relocation" as the same kind of event for staff (Art. 19), so relabeling a closure a "merger" changes the announcement, not the staffing math. It is also why the last consolidation hit staff so hard: PPS's own equity audit found that in the first year, 39% of staff of color at the affected schools left them, against 21% at other schools, and 18% left PPS altogether (the rate returned to normal by 2024–25) (see "PPS's own audit"). For families, that churn is not a side effect; the teachers and counselors who know your kids are exactly what a closure puts at risk.

What the research and other cities show#

Here is the fact that should anchor the whole debate: after decades of school closures across the country, there is no reliable evidence they deliver what districts promise: not the budget savings, not the academic gains, not greater equity. Pick whatever success metric you like; the track record isn't there.

Closures often don't save much money. Empty buildings still cost money to maintain, and transition costs add up. A decade after Chicago's 2013 closures, many buildings sat vacant and the district was still paying related debt. NBC Chicago Pew's study of 12 big-city districts found that once a district pays to secure, maintain, and insure an empty building, "the net operating savings achieved by closing a building typically is less than $1 million," and that more closed buildings were still sitting unused (301) than had been sold, leased, or reused (267). Pew Charitable Trusts (2013), p. 5 PPS's unsupported estimate of about $1 million per building isn't stated as net of those costs. A 2026 Stanford study of California districts found that those which closed schools were no more likely to escape financial distress than those that didn't. Stanford News

And in Portland, even the claimed savings are small next to the gap. For months PPS attached no dollar savings figure to rightsizing, saying the process is about "student outcomes, not dollars and cents." KATU On October 20 the superintendent finally put rough numbers on it, once, on a single slide: about $14 million under Scenario A and $11 million under Scenario B, roughly $1 million per closed building, presented as "planning estimates" with no breakdown of where the money comes from or whether it is net of new costs. PPS has published nothing to back them up. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Even taken at face value, that is a sixth to a fifth of the district's $65 million gap for 2027-28, which is handled separately, through staff and program cuts. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting · PPS budget A reform-friendly researcher told KATU the savings "are not very large" because displaced staff usually transfer rather than get cut: "you haven't saved any money because you're still employing the same amount of teachers." So by the district's own framing this isn't a budget fix, which puts the burden back on PPS to say what it actually is.

And the benefits it does promise aren't funded. The pitch for consolidation is that a bigger school gets more: a full-time librarian, fuller staffing, richer programs. But PPS's own family guides are blunt that none of it is guaranteed:

*"The possible benefits are goals. A larger school does not automatically get a full-time librarian, certain staff, or specific programs. Those details depend on the district's staffing rules, budget, and plans for making the changes." *PPS family guides

That is a remarkable thing for a district to put in writing while asking families to give up neighborhood schools for the gains it promises. The benefits aren't commitments; they're contingent, on a staffing plan PPS hasn't built and on money to close a $65 million budget gap that would have to come from somewhere. Closing schools doesn't produce that money. PPS is closing its gaps with cuts, not closures: it balanced this year's budget by eliminating hundreds of positions against a roughly $56 million shortfall, Willamette Week and plans to cut next year's $65 million the same way, starting with budget recommendations in January. PPS: Financial Update, Nov 17 So even if you accept that PPS must act, the upside it's selling isn't funded. And PPS has already been warned about exactly this: reviewing the last consolidation, its own equity auditors told it to build a funded staffing model before promising "well-resourced schools" at all. It is doing the reverse. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit The cost of closing a neighborhood school is certain; the benefits, by the district's own words, are not.

The district's own board deck makes the gap explicit. PPS's September 1 rightsizing presentation defines a "well-resourced school" as a set of inputs: "stable, qualified educators," "weekly arts, library and PE," "counseling and nursing support on site," a "full elective rotation", and titles the slides that follow "Magnitude: Moving Toward Sustainability." But those slides answer only one question: "how many changes do we need to make in order to stabilize the system?" And the answer is a running count of closures that push each school past 360 or 500 students. Crossing that enrollment line is what closures deliver; the staffing and programs that make a school "well-resourced" are a separate, unfunded bill. So the district tells its board that closures move schools "toward sustainability," and tells families, in the same breath, that a larger school "does not automatically get a full-time librarian, certain staff, or specific programs." PPS: Sept 1 board deck

Effects on students are mixed, and depend on where they land. Displaced students do fine when they move to a clearly better school and worse when they don't; outcomes are worst when many displaced students pile into one receiving school. WHYY (Philadelphia study) Chicago promised students would do better after its closures; that largely didn't happen. Chalkbeat

The closures with any track record of success are a different kind than Portland's. The clearest documented wins come from closing low-performing schools and routing students to clearly better ones. When New York City phased out 29 struggling high schools (2002–2008), students who would have enrolled instead chose higher-performing schools and graduated at rates about 15 points higher. NYU Research Alliance A 26-state CREDO/Stanford study found the same logic in reverse: across those states, displaced students gained only when they landed in a stronger school, and fewer than half did; most moved to a school about as good as the one they left, and saw no benefit. CREDO (2017) The common ingredient in every success case is a markedly better destination. Portland's rightsizing is a different case: it closes functioning neighborhood schools for enrollment reasons, and nothing PPS has published shows that the schools receiving their students are stronger, academically or in staffing, than the ones closing. The one thing that produced the gains elsewhere is the thing PPS hasn't demonstrated here.

Nationally, the burden tends to fall on low-income Black and Latino communities. Hechinger Report In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, closures drew a federal civil-rights complaint for disproportionately harming Black, Latino, and disabled students. SPLC

In Portland, the closures land unevenly. PPS's own regional summaries show them clustered where schools are smallest. Under Scenario A, Southeast Portland (the Cleveland/Franklin region) loses 6 schools and North Portland (Jefferson/Roosevelt) loses 4 (10 of the 14) while the west-side Ida B. Wells/Lincoln region and the Northeast's Grant/McDaniel region lose just 2 apiece. Cleveland–Franklin · Jefferson–Roosevelt · Grant–McDaniel · Wells–Lincoln The equity cost is sharpest in the programs being dismantled: almost every dual-language and heritage-language program being moved (Spanish, Mandarin, and Vietnamese, serving immigrant and multilingual families) is in these diverse North and East neighborhoods. Irvington, by contrast, gets a whole-community merge into a funded building.

The bottom line on the evidence: The enrollment problem is real; the question is whether closing schools is the right answer to it. On the record, the case is weak on every count PPS points to. The savings are unproven and, even by PPS's own estimate, small: $11–14 million against a $65 million gap, and closing schools elsewhere hasn't reliably eased districts' finances. The benefits aren't promised: PPS's own guides say a larger school doesn't automatically get a librarian, more staff, or new programs. The academic gains closures have produced elsewhere came from sending students to clearly better schools, and PPS hasn't shown that its receiving schools are stronger than the ones closing. And the cost lands hardest on North and Southeast Portland and on the multilingual families the district's equity language invokes. A real problem is being used to justify a prescription the evidence doesn't back, and the burden of proving otherwise belongs with the district, before the vote, not with the families who would live with the result.

Why PPS reached for this answer anyway is a separate question; for that context, see "The national playbook".

Where students land: the schools that would receive them#

Why this matters. Two arguments for the plan turn on where students end up. The national research says closures help only when displaced students land in a clearly better school (see "What the research and other cities show"). And board members backing the plan argue that it moves the district's focal students (students of color, students in poverty, students with disabilities, multilingual learners) into "sustainable" schools that can serve them better. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Both claims can be checked against the state's own data, so we checked them.

How we checked. For each of the 14 closing schools, we compared its 2025-26 state test results with those of the main school receiving its students, for all students and for each focal group the state reports. ODE: Assessment Group Reports We used grades 3–5 (grades 6–8 for Sellwood Middle and its receiving schools), so K-8 receiving schools like Beverly Cleary and King are compared on the same grades. Spending per student comes from the state's school-level spending report for 2024-25. ODE: School Level Expenditure Report When we first checked, no district document listed which school receives which closing school's students, so the pairings came from Director Stephanie Engelsman's list at the October 20 board meeting, PPS: Oct 20 board meeting the special-education parent group SEPTSA's report, SEPTSA and the district's own scenario summary for the dual-language moves. PPS: district-wide scenarios The figures behind every chart are in the table under it.

Reading, all students: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Percent of students meeting the state standard, 2025-26, grades 3–5 (grades 6–8 for Sellwood). Each closing school is paired with its main receiving school.

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Buckman→ Abernethy
Marysville→ Arleta
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Beach→ Chief Joseph
James John→ Sitton
Lewis→ Duniway
Woodmere→ Whitman
Maplewood→ Hayhurst
Stephenson→ Markham
Sabin→ King
Sellwood→ Hosford
Creston→ Atkinson
Rose City Park→ Scott
Peninsula→ Rosa Parks
Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Buckman52%Abernethy82%
Marysville32%Arleta61%
Irvington68%Beverly Cleary80%
Beach56%Chief Joseph66%
James John35%Sitton44%
Lewis71%Duniway76%
Woodmere29%Whitman33%
Maplewood64%Hayhurst67%
Stephenson74%Markham65%
Sabin58%King48%
Sellwood78%Hosford66%
Creston69%Atkinson57%
Rose City Park56%Scott39%
Peninsula44%Rosa Parks15%

On the measure the research uses, it's a coin flip. In reading, eight closing schools send students to a higher-scoring school, led by Buckman (52% to Abernethy's 82%), Marysville (32% to Arleta's 61%), and Irvington (68% to Beverly Cleary's 80%). Six send them to a lower-scoring one, led by Peninsula (44% to Rosa Parks' 15%), Rose City Park (56% to Scott's 39%), and Sellwood (78% to Hosford's 66%, and 37% at Brentwood for its other half). Math tips the other way: six higher, seven lower, one about even.

Math, all students: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Percent of students meeting the state standard, 2025-26, grades 3–5 (grades 6–8 for Sellwood). Each closing school is paired with its main receiving school.

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Marysville→ Arleta
Buckman→ Abernethy
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Beach→ Chief Joseph
Lewis→ Duniway
James John→ Sitton
Woodmere→ Whitman
Sabin→ King
Maplewood→ Hayhurst
Creston→ Atkinson
Stephenson→ Markham
Sellwood→ Hosford
Rose City Park→ Scott
Peninsula→ Rosa Parks
Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Marysville24%Arleta56%
Buckman40%Abernethy72%
Irvington61%Beverly Cleary80%
Beach48%Chief Joseph61%
Lewis64%Duniway75%
James John27%Sitton37%
Woodmere28%Whitman26%
Sabin48%King44%
Maplewood65%Hayhurst60%
Creston65%Atkinson55%
Stephenson74%Markham60%
Sellwood71%Hosford55%
Rose City Park54%Scott37%
Peninsula40%Rosa Parks12%

The biggest drops land in North Portland and in the dual-language programs. Peninsula's students move from 44% to 15% in reading and from 40% to 12% in math. Sabin's students move to King, 58% to 48% in reading. And the Spanish-immersion students from Beach (56%) and James John (35%) move to César Chávez, where 20% of third-to-fifth graders meet the reading standard. These are the families the district's equity case is built around.

Students with disabilities: about half land lower, and the drops are steep. Where the state reports their results at both schools, students with disabilities move to a lower-scoring setting in 4 of 9 cases in reading and 5 of 9 in math. The largest drops: Stephenson (57% to Markham's 20% in reading), Sellwood (53% to Hosford's 27%), and Rose City Park (44% to Scott's 29%). The two clear gains are Maplewood (18% to Hayhurst's 59%) and James John (20% to Sitton's 33%). This matches what the special-education parent group found from a different direction: receiving schools that would absorb more students with disabilities without the space or staff to match. SEPTSA

Reading, students with disabilities: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Percent of students meeting the state standard, 2025-26, grades 3–5 (grades 6–8 for Sellwood). Each closing school is paired with its main receiving school.

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Maplewood→ Hayhurst
James John→ Sitton
Marysville→ Arleta
Creston→ Atkinson
Sabin→ King
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Rose City Park→ Scott
Sellwood→ Hosford
Stephenson→ Markham

Not shown, because the state hides results for fewer than 10 students tested: Buckman, Lewis, Beach, Woodmere, Peninsula.

Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Maplewood18%Hayhurst59%
James John20%Sitton33%
Marysville38%Arleta42%
Creston43%Atkinson46%
Sabin26%King27%
Irvington54%Beverly Cleary50%
Rose City Park44%Scott29%
Sellwood53%Hosford27%
Stephenson57%Markham20%

The plan also closes three of the schools PPS built for them. Since 2023, PPS has been turning neighborhood schools into "Inclusive School Communities," where students with disabilities are taught in their own neighborhood school instead of in a separate program at another school; there are now eight. PPS: Inclusive School Communities Both scenarios close three of them: Marysville, James John, and Peninsula. That's more than a third of the program, against fewer than one in four of the district's elementary and K-8 schools (13 of 56). PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025 PPS's own progress report on the model, from this year, is encouraging: its students attended school better than a comparison group on every measure, and 24.2% of its autistic students met reading expectations, against 10.7% in the comparison group. PPS: Inclusive Schools Progress Report 2025-26 The inclusive schools that remain would take on much of the load: SEPTSA estimates they would average about 470 students, up from 307 today, with about 123 students on IEPs each, up from 73. SEPTSA

In fairness, PPS describes these as early, modest results, its math results showed no clear difference, and closing a building doesn't end the model: Peninsula's students would move to Rosa Parks and James John's to Sitton, both inclusive schools, and PPS says Marysville and Arleta would unite as one inclusive school. PPS family guides The question is whether those schools get the staff to absorb them. After the last consolidation, staff at the affected schools said they didn't (see PPS's own audit of the last consolidation).

Students in poverty: mixed, and here the plan's defenders have a point. Comparing students in poverty with students in poverty removes much of the difference that comes from who attends each school. On that measure the picture is more even. At King, students in poverty outscore their peers at Sabin (19% vs. 7% in reading, 25% vs. 7% in math), and at Sitton they outscore their peers at James John (32% vs. 19%). But Sellwood's students in poverty move from 51% to 30% at Hosford, Rose City Park's from 26% to 17% at Scott, and Maplewood's from 50% to 22% at Hayhurst (only 10 of Maplewood's students in poverty were tested). Results for students in poverty are hidden at half the pairs.

Black students: the data can't show what the plan's defenders claim. The state hides results for any grade with fewer than 10 students tested. At every one of the 14 closing schools, that hides Black students' results, in both subjects. So there is no public test data showing how Black students at the closing schools are doing, or whether moving them would help. What the data does show is the receiving schools. Where Black students' results are reported there, most are below the district average for Black students (20% in reading, grades 3–5): King 15%, Rosa Parks 15%, Kelly 10%, and Scott 10%, with Brentwood at 10% in grades 6–8 (district average 19%). Sitton (31%) and Markham (42%) are above it. These groups are small, between 10 and 49 students tested, so treat any single school's number with caution. But Peninsula's and Sabin's students, about 60 Black students between them, go to Rosa Parks and King, two of the schools where Black students currently score below the district's Black-student average. ODE: Assessment Group Reports

How many Black students are involved. PPS's own enrollment count shows 251 Black students at the 14 closing schools this year, 5.9% of their students, somewhat below the district's share (8.3%). PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025 Where they would go:

Closing school Black students Main receiving school Black students
Marysville 37 (12.1%) Arleta 5 (2.2%)
Peninsula 32 (13.4%) Rosa Parks 57 (35.6%)
Beach 32 (11.1%) Chief Joseph* 13 (5.4%)
James John 28 (7.7%) Sitton* 40 (11.6%)
Sabin 28 (10.4%) King 100 (31.3%)
Irvington 23 (8.9%) Beverly Cleary 11 (2.3%)
Woodmere 23 (10.1%) Whitman 22 (11.3%)
Buckman 13 (4.6%) Abernethy 3 (1.1%)
Rose City Park 9 (2.2%) Scott 49 (10.3%)
Stephenson 8 (2.8%) Markham 58 (17.1%)
Maplewood 5 (1.7%) Hayhurst 17 (5.9%)
Creston 5 (2.3%) Atkinson 4 (1.1%)
Lewis 4 (1.5%) Duniway none reported
Sellwood 4 (0.7%) Hosford / Brentwood 14 (2.7%) / 58 (13.0%)

* Spanish-immersion students go to César Chávez, which enrolls 52 Black students (11.7%). Counts are as of October 1, 2025, and include every grade, not just the tested ones.

Spending per student: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Total spending per student, 2024-25, all funding sources (Oregon Department of Education).

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Peninsula→ Rosa Parks
Sabin→ King
Rose City Park→ Scott
Stephenson→ Markham
James John→ Sitton
Sellwood→ Hosford
Woodmere→ Whitman
Buckman→ Abernethy
Beach→ Chief Joseph
Lewis→ Duniway
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Marysville→ Arleta
Creston→ Atkinson
Maplewood→ Hayhurst
Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Peninsula$26.6kRosa Parks$33.3k
Sabin$23.8kKing$26.2k
Rose City Park$23.6kScott$25.6k
Stephenson$22.1kMarkham$23.9k
James John$25.6kSitton$26.8k
Sellwood$21.4kHosford$21.4k
Woodmere$28.5kWhitman$28.3k
Buckman$24.0kAbernethy$23.2k
Beach$25.3kChief Joseph$23.9k
Lewis$23.2kDuniway$21.8k
Irvington$23.9kBeverly Cleary$21.6k
Marysville$27.5kArleta$25.1k
Creston$27.0kAtkinson$23.3k
Maplewood$22.8kHayhurst$18.9k

Spending per student follows the receiving school, not the merger. Students moving into high-poverty schools land where spending per student is already higher, mostly because of federal and equity-formula money: Peninsula's students go from $26.6k to $33.3k at Rosa Parks, and Sabin's from $23.8k to $26.2k at King. Students moving into larger, lower-poverty schools land where it's lower: Irvington's go from $23.9k to $21.6k at Beverly Cleary, and Lewis's from $23.2k to $21.8k at Duniway. That second pattern is the efficiency PPS is after: fixed costs spread over more students. Either way, closing a building doesn't add money per student; it moves students into whatever the receiving school already spends. Spending also measures cost, not services. Whether merged schools actually get more teachers, specialists, or smaller classes depends on the staffing plan the superintendent has promised with her November 17 recommendation. ODE: School Level Expenditure Report

In fairness, doing nothing isn't a neutral option either: under the status quo, more schools shrink below the size PPS says it needs to staff a full program, and the district projects that only 48% of students would be in a "sustainable" school. PPS: district-wide scenarios But "sustainable" counts students, not outcomes. On the outcome the research says matters, this plan moves about as many students down as up, and the moves that go down fall hardest on North Portland, on dual-language families, and on students with disabilities.

Questions this raises for the board:

  • Where a closing school's students split among several schools, what share goes to each? PPS has published the shares for only a few.
  • For each receiving school, what is the plan to serve students moving in from a higher-scoring school, and students with disabilities in particular?
  • Will the staffing plan show, school by school, whether merged schools get more staff per student than the schools closing?

The equity case for closures, checked against the data#

On October 20, after staff presented the scenarios' "equity analysis," two board members made the most forceful case anyone has made for this plan. Director Rashelle Chase-Miller, who represents Zone 4, grew up in Northeast Portland, and attended its schools, said she was "trembling with anger" and called the gaps the slides showed "immoral." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Vice Chair Michelle DePass, also raised in Portland, called the same slides "appalling." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Both spoke from their own and their families' experience of racism in Portland and in PPS, and nothing here questions that.

This page checks their argument, claim by claim, against PPS's own presentation and the state's data. Every quote links to its moment in the meeting video. The short version: they are right about the problem, and the plan's logic for fixing it doesn't hold up.

1. The "immoral" numbers measure building size, not resources

"The number of our focal students who do not currently attend fully resourced schools is shocking." — Director Chase-Miller (video)

The slides Chase-Miller and DePass reacted to didn't measure resources. They measured how many students attend a "sustainable" school, which PPS defines as a school at or above its enrollment line: 360 students for a K-5 school, 500 for a K-8 or middle school. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Nothing in that measure counts teachers, counselors, class sizes, or how students are doing. DePass described the same slide as "the number of students currently not being served." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting It is a count of students in small buildings.

PPS bar chart, Jefferson/Roosevelt: share of students in a sustainable school. Status quo, Scenario A, Scenario B: all students 36%, 82%, 82%; students experiencing poverty 32%, 84%, 84%; historically underserved students 35%, 85%, 85%; students receiving special education services 26%, 80%, 80%; multilingual learners 34%, 92%, 92%.
PPS's slide for North Portland, shown at the October 20 board meeting. "Status quo" is PPS's projection for 2031-32 if nothing changes, not today's enrollment. Both scenarios close the same four schools here, so A and B match. The slide's notes, cropped out of this image with the video player's overlay, read: "Both scenarios close the same 4 schools. It will have the lowest percentage of students in sustainable schools and sees the largest gains in the district. Every focal group gains more than students overall."

That matters because the measure scores itself. Close a small school, move its students into a bigger one, and every one of them is now "in a sustainable school." That is why staff could report that under both scenarios "every focal group gains more than students overall." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The gain is in the definition. Staff also conceded that students in special education "start lowest" on this measure "and they also remain lowest." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting PPS's own districtwide slide shows the same pattern, with special education lowest in every column:

PPS bar chart, districtwide: share of students in a sustainable school. Status quo, Scenario A, Scenario B: all students 48%, 80%, 73%; students experiencing poverty 42%, 81%, 74%; historically underserved students 46%, 83%, 78%; students receiving special education services 41%, 77%, 69%; multilingual learners 44%, 87%, 77%.
PPS's districtwide slide, shown at the October 20 board meeting (2031-32 projections). Its notes, cropped out here, read: "about half with no changes; 8 in 10 under Scenario A; 7 in 10 under Scenario B. Every focal group gains more than all students combined."

Two ways to score the same moves

36% → 82%

of North Portland students in a "sustainable" school by 2031-32: with no changes vs. under either scenario, on PPS's own slide. Every focal group rises further, to between 80% and 92%.

PPS slide, Oct 20 (Jefferson/Roosevelt)

7 of 14

closing schools send their students to a school with higher reading results. The other 7 send them somewhere lower.

Our analysis of state data

"Sustainable" means a school at or above PPS's size line (360 students for a K-5 school, 500 for a K-8 or middle school). Moving students into a bigger building raises the first number automatically. Only the second measures anything about how students are doing.

Where the logic breaks: a number that rises whenever a building closes can't be the evidence that closing the building helps. PPS says size is what lets a school staff a full program. That may be true, but it's a promise about staffing, and the staffing plan hasn't been published (see point 3). PPS's own auditors drew the same line after the last consolidation: the district "should be able to demonstrate not only that enrollment numbers improve on paper, but that students will experience more stable staffing, stronger supports, broader programming, and more equitable access." PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation

2. The plan doesn't send Black students to the schools that are working for them

"How are you going to ensure that black and brown kids in PPS get an education that's comparable to what your students are getting?" — Director Chase-Miller (video)

That's the right question to ask of the plan. The research is clear that closures help students only when they land in a clearly better school, and fewer than half do. CREDO (2017) So we checked where Portland's students land (full results: "Where students land"). In reading, 8 of the 14 closing schools send students to a higher-scoring school and 6 to a lower-scoring one; in math, 6 and 7, with one about even. The steepest drops are in North Portland and the dual-language programs: Peninsula's students move from a school where 44% meet the reading standard to Rosa Parks, at 15%, and the Spanish-immersion students from Beach and James John move to César Chávez, at 20%. ODE: Assessment Group Reports

For Black students specifically, the state hides results at all 14 closing schools, because fewer than 10 were tested in each grade. So no public data shows how Black students at those schools are doing, or that they'd do better after moving. The receiving schools are a different story. Where the state does report Black students' results there, most are below the district's own Black-student average, including King and Rosa Parks, which would receive Sabin's and Peninsula's students, about 60 Black students between them. PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025

Black students' reading results at the schools that would receive students

Percent of Black students meeting the state reading standard, 2025-26, grades 3–5 (grades 6–8 at Brentwood). Only receiving schools where the state reports Black students' results.

District average for Black students (20%)

Markhamfrom Stephenson (Scenario A); 12 tested
Sittonfrom James John; 13 tested
Rosa Parksfrom Peninsula; 13 tested
Kingfrom Sabin; 41 tested
Brentwoodfrom Sellwood (grades 6–8); 49 tested
Kellyfrom parts of Marysville and Woodmere; 10 tested
Scottfrom Rose City Park (Scenario A); 10 tested

At all 14 closing schools, the state hides Black students' results (fewer than 10 tested per grade), so the closing side can't be shown. The district average for Black students is 20% in grades 3–5 and 19% in grades 6–8. Groups this small swing from year to year.

Show as a table
Black students meeting the standard
Markham (from Stephenson (Scenario A); 12 tested)42%
Sitton (from James John; 13 tested)31%
Rosa Parks (from Peninsula; 13 tested)15%
King (from Sabin; 41 tested)15%
Brentwood (from Sellwood (grades 6–8); 49 tested)10%
Kelly (from parts of Marysville and Woodmere; 10 tested)10%
Scott (from Rose City Park (Scenario A); 10 tested)10%

Chase-Miller warned against this herself. At the board's March 31 work session, reporting back for a small group of directors, she named as something to avoid "adverse impacts to students from communities that have been historically underserved," along with "paternalistic perspectives like: the underserved kids will be better off by joining the privileged kids, based on assumptions that we may or may not have about both communities." PPS Board of Education meetings (March 31, 2026 work session) Her October 20 argument leans on a version of that assumption, that moving is itself the help, and in North and outer Southeast Portland most moves don't even reach a stronger school: they stay within the same high-poverty neighborhoods.

In fairness, a school's average mostly reflects who attends it, and for students in poverty some comparisons favor the receiving school: at King, they outscore their peers at Sabin. And PPS's own audit of its last consolidation found small reading gains at the affected schools for several groups, including multilingual learners and, in the first year, Black students, though the Black students' gain faded the next year and didn't hold up in a second test. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation That's real, and it's the best evidence the plan's defenders have. It came from boundary and program changes, though, not from closing 14 schools, and it shows students holding steady more than moving to stronger schools. Where the logic breaks: "comparable to what your students are getting" would mean sending students to schools where students like them do better. For most of the moves in North Portland, the state's data says the opposite, and PPS hasn't published anything that says otherwise.

3. "No one is coming to save us," and this plan doesn't either

"What money do you think they have for us? No one is coming to save us. This is our moment to make a change for our kids." — Director Chase-Miller (video)

She's right about Salem. But the plan isn't a rescue. The only estimate PPS has given of what closures save, presented once at the October 20 board meeting with no analysis behind it, is about $14 million in "operational savings" under Scenario A and $11 million under Scenario B, against a $65 million gap. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The same slide claims what that buys. With no closures, the schools' share of the cuts is $32.3 million, about 223 positions. Under Scenario A it falls to $18.3 million, about 126 positions; under Scenario B, to $21.3 million, about 147. The savings could "potentially preserve or reinvest the equivalent of" about 97 (A) or 76 (B) positions. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Those 223 are only the school-based share: on November 2 the superintendent said up to 450 full-time positions could be cut districtwide. KPTV, Nov 2 So even the larger plan still cuts more than a hundred positions from schools, and PPS hasn't said whether the savings recur in later years or what they are net of. And she was explicit that these are "planning estimates, not final staffing decisions or guaranteed reinvestments." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The cost and staffing analysis comes with her November 17 recommendation. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting

Even by PPS's estimate, closures shrink the cuts to schools. They don't stop them.

Millions of dollars, from PPS's own slide at the October 20 board meeting. The $65 million gap gets closed either way; the other three bars are the cuts that would fall on schools. Closing schools would trim that share by an estimated $14 million (A) or $11 million (B) in "operational savings," figures PPS hasn't backed with any published analysis.

Budget gap (closed either way)
No closures223 positions
Scenario A (14 closures)126 positions
Scenario B (11 closures)147 positions

PPS says the savings could "potentially preserve or reinvest the equivalent of" about 97 (A) or 76 (B) positions. It hasn't said whether the savings recur or what they are net of, such as busing or upkeep of closed buildings.

Show as a table
Millions of dollars
Budget gap (closed either way)$65M
No closures (223 positions)$32.3M
Scenario A (14 closures) (126 positions)$18.3M
Scenario B (11 closures) (147 positions)$21.3M

Nor do closures move money toward the students the argument is about. Spending per student follows the receiving school: students moving into high-poverty schools land where spending is already higher, and students moving into large, lower-poverty schools land where it's lower (see "Where students land"). Nothing in the savings estimate is earmarked for North or outer Southeast Portland, for Title I schools, or for any focal group. And the board was given these numbers before it got answers to its own questions about them: as of October 19, directors' written questions on the net savings from closing a school, the cost of added busing, and the cost of moving programs were all still "In process." PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19

Chase-Miller has pressed staff on exactly this. In written questions on October 6, she asked, "What specific resources will students gain in the receiving school?", "What will PPS do if projected savings do not translate into school-level improvements?", and "How will PPS protect student belonging, cultural identity, and school-community relationships, especially for racially minoritized students?" As of October 19, the answer to all three was "In process." PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19

Where the logic breaks: "make a change for our kids" assumes the change carries resources to them. As of October 20, the plan commits none.

4. Merging can dissolve the funding meant for these students

"I don't want to underfund our historically underserved kids." — Vice Chair DePass, recalling an 1800s Portland board that refused a segregated school the $800 it needed (video)

The plan has a case of exactly that. Brentwood Middle School is a Title I school where nearly half the students (46.5%) are from the groups PPS counts as historically underserved, and where, as Director Stephanie Engelsman relayed from its families, "our black and brown kids are the majority of our school and they love it." Under Scenario A it would absorb half of Sellwood Middle School. Reading from district data, Engelsman said the share of Brentwood's students from underserved racial groups would fall from 46.5% to 26.9%, students in poverty from 57.5% to 32.1%, and multilingual learners from 18.6% to 9%, and the school would no longer qualify for Title I. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting PPS's own enrollment count matches her figures for Brentwood today (listed under its former name, Lane). PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025 The Scenario A figures are hers; PPS hasn't published them.

Brentwood Middle School today, and after it absorbs half of Sellwood (Scenario A)

Share of Brentwood's students in each group. Today's figures are PPS's October 1, 2025 count; the Scenario A figures are as Director Engelsman read them on October 20. Brentwood is a Title I school today; under either scenario it would not be.

Brentwood todayAfter Scenario A

Students from underserved racial groups
Students experiencing poverty
Multilingual learners

Scenario B is nearly the same: 25.5%, 30.6% and 9.2%.

Show as a table
Closing schoolBrentwood todayAfter Scenario A
Students from underserved racial groups46.5%26.9%
Students experiencing poverty57.5%32.1%
Multilingual learners18.6%9%

Her point was about what happens to the money that "follows the kids": "if the same number of kids moves to a larger school and they become a much smaller percentage of that greater school, there simply are less resources that can be dedicated to them." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Elsewhere the problem runs the other way. The special-education parent group SEPTSA's preliminary analysis found the plan would further concentrate students at higher-poverty receiving schools that may not have room to meet projected needs. SEPTSA

In fairness, PPS says the district doesn't lose Title I money when students move. In a written answer about Buckman, staff explained that the federal dollars follow the district's count of students in poverty and go to whichever schools clear PPS's threshold, 33% of students directly certified for state benefits; when a school falls short, "the district redirects those funds to other PPS schools." PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19 So the money stays in PPS. It just doesn't stay with these students: a merged Brentwood would have about 32% of its students directly certified, just under the line.

Where the logic breaks: DePass's story is a warning against taking resources from the students who need them most. Breaking up a Title I school doesn't take the money out of PPS, but it takes it away from the school these students attend.

5. "Always on the menu": the plan puts the same neighborhoods on it again

"Any of us who grew up in North Portland or inner Northeast or outer Southeast know that we are always on the menu." — Director Chase-Miller (video)

That is the most powerful line of the night, and it's an argument against this plan. Ten of the 14 proposed closures are in North and Southeast Portland. Under either scenario, a third of North Portland's K-8 students would change schools, the highest share in the city, including 39% of its multilingual learners. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Chase-Miller acknowledged it herself: "our communities stand to face the most change." (video)

Who has to move: share of K-8 students changing schools, by region

Percent of each region's K-8 students who would move to a new school or site, as presented by PPS staff on October 20.

Scenario AScenario B

North (Jefferson & Roosevelt)
Southeast (Cleveland & Franklin)
Northeast
West (Lincoln & Wells)
District K-8 overall

In North Portland, 39% of multilingual learners would move under either scenario.

Show as a table
Scenario AScenario B
North (Jefferson & Roosevelt)33%33%
Southeast (Cleveland & Franklin)30%27%
Northeast26%19%
West (Lincoln & Wells)18%13%
District K-8 overall27%24%

Near the end of the meeting, DePass objected to families describing the plan as "redlining" or "segregation," calling those terms "loaded and actually just not correct." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Taken literally, she has a point: redlining was a housing and lending practice, and no one is drawing new red lines. But the families using the word, including a Marysville counselor who told the board that "pushing students and their families to different schools… sounds much more like redlining to me," PPS: Oct 20 board meeting are describing the same pattern PPS's own staff named: the map this plan works from is redlining's legacy, and the burden lands where it always has.

In fairness, staff say that districtwide, students in each focal group move at close to the overall rate, and that both scenarios also move students into Title I schools. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The imbalance is by neighborhood, not by student group. But that is exactly the pattern "always on the menu" describes.

6. Integrating Portland's schools, or sorting them? The plan does both, and no one chose which

If this is an equity plan, a basic question is whether it leaves students in more integrated schools or less. PPS hasn't said. Its equity slides count students in "sustainable" schools, and none of them show who ends up in school with whom. So we checked, comparing each closing school with its main receiving school on two measures: the share of students who are white, from the state's October 2025 enrollment count, and the share in poverty, from PPS's own count. ODE: Fall Membership Report 2025-26 · PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025

White students: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Share of each school's students who are white, October 1, 2025 (Oregon Department of Education). PPS overall: 54%. Each closing school is paired with its main receiving school.

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Marysville→ Arleta
Beach→ Chief Joseph
Buckman→ Abernethy
Lewis→ Duniway
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Woodmere→ Whitman
James John→ Sitton
Maplewood→ Hayhurst
Rose City Park→ Scott
Sellwood→ Hosford
Creston→ Atkinson
Stephenson→ Markham
Peninsula→ Rosa Parks
Sabin→ King

Sorted from the biggest increase to the biggest decrease.

Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Marysville36%Arleta62%
Beach46%Chief Joseph69%
Buckman62%Abernethy76%
Lewis65%Duniway78%
Irvington62%Beverly Cleary71%
Woodmere34%Whitman36%
James John32%Sitton33%
Maplewood67%Hayhurst67%
Rose City Park46%Scott38%
Sellwood80%Hosford70%
Creston66%Atkinson53%
Stephenson68%Markham49%
Peninsula45%Rosa Parks14%
Sabin63%King24%

There's no consistent direction. Five closing schools send their students to a school whose white share is more than 5 points higher, six to one more than 5 points lower, and three to one about the same. That's what you'd expect from how the pairs were drawn. Explaining one of them, staff wrote that "the quantitative model optimizes for building utilization." PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19 Each closing school is matched with a nearby building that has room, so the result follows the city's existing neighborhood lines.

At one end, students move into whiter, wealthier schools. Five closures send students to a school that is both whiter and lower-poverty: Irvington to Beverly Cleary (62% white to 71%; 21% of students in poverty to 11%), Buckman to Abernethy (62% to 76%; 36% to 11%), Lewis to Duniway (65% to 78%; 22% to 8%), Beach's neighborhood students to Chief Joseph (46% to 69%; 35% to 22%), and Marysville to Arleta (36% to 62%; 58% to 25%). Their students of color become a smaller minority in their new school.

At the other end, poverty concentrates. Peninsula's students move to Rosa Parks, where 79% of students are in poverty, against 38% at Peninsula; the share who are white falls from 45% to 14%. Sabin's students move to King: 63% white to 24%, and 28% in poverty to 51%. Nine of the 14 closing schools send students to a school with a higher poverty rate.

Students in poverty: closing school vs. the school receiving its students

Share of each school's students directly certified for state benefits such as SNAP, PPS's measure of poverty, October 1, 2025. PPS overall: 31.5%.

Closing schoolSchool receiving its students

Peninsula→ Rosa Parks
Stephenson→ Markham
Sabin→ King
Rose City Park→ Scott
Sellwood→ Hosford
Creston→ Atkinson
Maplewood→ Hayhurst
James John→ Sitton
Woodmere→ Whitman
Irvington→ Beverly Cleary
Beach→ Chief Joseph
Lewis→ Duniway
Buckman→ Abernethy
Marysville→ Arleta

Sorted from the biggest increase to the biggest decrease.

Show as a table
Closing schoolResultReceiving schoolResult
Peninsula38%Rosa Parks79%
Stephenson10%Markham38%
Sabin28%King51%
Rose City Park33%Scott52%
Sellwood13%Hosford26%
Creston24%Atkinson32%
Maplewood20%Hayhurst26%
James John54%Sitton60%
Woodmere59%Whitman64%
Irvington21%Beverly Cleary11%
Beach35%Chief Joseph22%
Lewis22%Duniway8%
Buckman36%Abernethy11%
Marysville58%Arleta25%

The dual-language moves split schools along language and ethnic lines. At Beach and James John, the plan sends Spanish-immersion students one way and everyone else another. Beach's immersion students go to César Chávez, which is 16% white and 64% Latino, while its neighborhood students go to Chief Joseph, which is 69% white. PPS's own auditors found that the last time it converted a school to whole-school dual-language, the change displaced "non-DLI neighborhood families along racial lines," and the school's share of Black students fell from 10% to 2%. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation Director La Forte relayed in writing that to James John families, whole-school dual-language for North Portland "felt like 'defacto segregation.'" PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19

Some moves do integrate. Sellwood's students would join Brentwood, Stephenson's would join Markham, Rose City Park's would join Scott, and Creston's would join Atkinson. Each of those produces a more mixed school, and Brentwood shows what that can cost: it loses its Title I funding (see point 4).

In fairness, a citywide plan has real reasons behind it: closing only North Portland's schools would put those neighborhoods "on the menu" again, and PPS's auditors recommended that future closures take in every part of the city. Integration also looks different depending on whose students you count. Irvington's students move into a whiter school, but Beverly Cleary itself becomes more diverse.

Where the logic breaks: a plan presented as an equity plan should be able to say whether it integrates schools or sorts them. PPS's auditors told it to publish, "for each proposed closure, consolidation, program move, or boundary change option," an impact summary "disaggregated by race and ethnicity, multilingual learner status, special education status, and poverty." PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation PPS hasn't. Its equity analysis measures building size, and this plan integrates some schools and sorts others without anyone having chosen either.

7. "My kids' school is gonna stay under-resourced"

"We don't have enough teachers of color, we don't have enough experienced teachers in these schools, and that is showing up in our students' outcomes … My kids' school is gonna stay under-resourced. And that's a school full of black kids in North Portland." — Director Chase-Miller (video)

Here Chase-Miller named both the cause and the limit of the plan. The cause she named is staffing: too few experienced teachers and teachers of color, and substitutes who won't take jobs in North Portland. The superintendent said the same thing earlier that evening, pointing to the district's past effort to raise substitute pay in North Portland schools and to the research on teacher turnover: "if we have an opportunity to … better support and stabilize those schools with staffing, our students will be in stronger environments." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting

Closing buildings doesn't hire or keep teachers. Consolidations move staff around, and in the first year of the last one PPS ran, 39% of staff of color at the affected schools left them, nearly twice the rate elsewhere (see "What it means for teachers and staff" and "PPS's own audit of the last consolidation"). And by her own account, the plan leaves her children's majority-Black North Portland school as under-resourced as it is now.

Where the logic breaks: if the problem is staffing in North and outer Southeast schools, the fix is staffing in North and outer Southeast schools. The plan doesn't commit to any.

8. "If your school is doing okay … you can afford to wait"

"If your school is doing okay and your kids are doing okay, then you can afford to wait. But my kids cannot wait." — Director Chase-Miller (video)

This is aimed at families from schools like Irvington, including the author of this guide, and it lands partly: Irvington's students would move to a higher-scoring school. But the people asking the board to slow down that night weren't only from lower-poverty schools. They included North Portland and Spanish-immersion families, the Marysville counselor, the teachers' union, and SEPTSA, whose concerns are about students with disabilities across the city.

Who are "your students"? Chase-Miller framed the plan's critics as families whose children aren't "black and brown kids," who "don't want the benefits," and who can "afford to wait." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting The record doesn't support that line. Among those who objected that night were a Marysville counselor speaking for students from "the same historically marginalized community of color that PPS claims to be centering," PPS: Oct 20 board meeting and Spanish-speaking immersion families who, as Director Engelsman reported from a listening session, were "furious." PPS: Oct 20 board meeting And the schools the plan closes look like the district. Of their 4,258 students, 32% are from the groups PPS counts as historically underserved (Black, Latino, Native American, Pacific Islander, and multiracial students), against 35.6% across PPS's elementary and K-8 schools. At James John, Woodmere, and Marysville they are the majority. Even at the closing schools with the fewest, they are 13% to 22% of students, before counting Asian American students, whom PPS leaves out of that measure. PPS: Enrollment of Underserved Groups, Oct 1, 2025

Historically underserved students at each closing school

Share of students who are Black, Latino, Native American, Pacific Islander or multiracial, PPS's "historically underserved" groups, October 1, 2025.

PPS elementary and K-8 schools (35.6%)

James John233 of 365 students
Woodmere118 of 227 students
Marysville155 of 307 students
Beach139 of 288 students
Peninsula115 of 239 students
Irvington83 of 259 students
Sabin82 of 269 students
Buckman84 of 283 students
Creston47 of 213 students
Lewis56 of 259 students
Maplewood60 of 287 students
Rose City Park70 of 417 students
Stephenson47 of 281 students
Sellwood (middle school)75 of 564 students

PPS's measure doesn't count Asian American students. Across all 14 closing schools: 1,364 of 4,258 students (32%). Middle schools districtwide: 34%.

Show as a table
Historically underserved students
James John (233 of 365 students)64%
Woodmere (118 of 227 students)52%
Marysville (155 of 307 students)50%
Beach (139 of 288 students)48%
Peninsula (115 of 239 students)48%
Irvington (83 of 259 students)32%
Sabin (82 of 269 students)30%
Buckman (84 of 283 students)30%
Creston (47 of 213 students)22%
Lewis (56 of 259 students)22%
Maplewood (60 of 287 students)21%
Rose City Park (70 of 417 students)17%
Stephenson (47 of 281 students)17%
Sellwood (middle school) (75 of 564 students)13%

Drawing the line as one set of neighborhoods against another doesn't describe the opposition, and it erases the families of color on the side of the line she put her opponents on. It also splits communities that have more in common here than not: none of them has been shown that this plan will serve their children better.

And it isn't the opponents who are getting ahead of the evidence. The board presentation that will "dig into the data of the focal groups, special education, multilingual learners, Black and Native" students is scheduled for November 4, PPS: Oct 20 board meeting after the scenarios were drawn up, and the equity impact statement staff promised comes with the November recommendation. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Asking to see the data on Black students before a plan is sold as being for them isn't a luxury. It's the least the equity case should require.

"What solutions are you bringing to the table?"

"So, all of you who are here to protest this decision … What solutions are you bringing to the table?" — Director Chase-Miller (video)

It's a fair challenge, and "slow down" isn't an answer by itself. Here are five, each aimed at the problems she named:

  1. Staff stability, in writing, for Title I and focal-group schools. Retention pay for experienced teachers, the substitute-pay approach the superintendent described, and a commitment that any closure savings go there first.
  2. Class-size caps in writing before the vote (see "What the superintendent told Irvington families").
  3. A receiving-school test. No closure unless PPS publishes, for that pair, evidence that the receiving school serves the moving students' groups better, including students with disabilities and Black students where data exists.
  4. Fight for the money together. The board, the teachers' union, and families all want the state to release its school reserve fund. KATU Make that the shared fight, in Salem, before any school closes (see "What we're asking for").
  5. Put the equity data first. Hold the November 4 presentation on Black, Native, multilingual, and special-education students, and the equity impact statement, before the recommendation is final, and let them shape it.

Questions this raises for the board:

  • Will PPS publish, for every closing school, how the students moving out compare with students at the receiving school, by focal group?
  • How much of the estimated savings will go to Title I and focal-group schools, and will that be in writing before the vote?
  • Will the November 4 data on Black and Native students, and the equity impact statement, come before the recommendation is final?
  • What happens to Brentwood's Title I funding, and to the students it pays for, if it absorbs half of Sellwood?

The districts PPS chose as models#

When PPS staff laid out how to design this process at a March 31, 2026 board work session, they offered three peer districts to learn from: San Antonio, Seattle, and Denver, alongside Oregon PTA guidance. Staff pointed to San Antonio for its iterative decision framework, to Seattle for how it defined a well-resourced school, and to Denver for its closure criteria and equity guardrails. PPS Board of Education meetings (March 31, 2026 work session) Every lesson named was about process. Nothing presented that evening described how those processes turned out. Here is how they did, by each district's own records. None delivered what PPS is now promising Portland: stability, reinvestment, and better-resourced schools.

Seattle called its closures off. In September 2024, the district whose "well-resourced schools" framing PPS borrowed proposed closing as many as 21 schools to save up to $31.5 million. Within two months the list was down to four and the projected savings to about $5.5 million, against a deficit near $100 million, and the board unanimously canceled the plan. Seattle's own numbers show why: the average closure saved about $1.5 million a year, and the final plan would have left one merged school (Stevens and Montlake, 322 students) still below the district's own 400-student benchmark. In fairness, Seattle hasn't solved its budget problem the other way either, and its leaders say closures may return. But once the numbers were real, it decided closing schools wasn't worth the cost. KUOW · SPS FAQ · SPS analysis of the four schools

Denver closed ten schools, and its "savings" were mostly money that followed the students. Denver's superintendent put the recommendation's budget savings at $29.9 million, then, in the same table, subtracted $23.3 million that simply follows displaced students to their new schools. What was left: $6.6 million, to be "reinvested" through the regular budget. DPS recommendation package, p. 28 Days earlier, voters had approved a $975 million bond on the promise that every school would get something; the closure list came out two days after it passed, and a Denver Gazette analysis found the campuses later closed or restructured were allocated far less than schools that stayed open (about $2.6 million versus $4.1 million on average). Denver Gazette Enrollment then fell faster than projected, and Denver's superintendent now says he expects to override the board's own four-year closure moratorium. Chalkbeat This is the closest parallel to Armstrong's promise to reinvest "all of the funds from closures and consolidations directly back into schools": in Denver, most of that money was the students' own per-pupil funding moving with them. In fairness, about half of Denver's displaced students chose higher-rated schools, helped by guaranteed priority and busing through open school choice, which PPS's scenarios don't offer. Chalkbeat

San Antonio closed 15 schools, and is closing more. San Antonio ISD's board voted 5–2 in November 2023 to close 15 schools and merge or redesign five more. A week into the next school year, about one in five affected students hadn't shown up; enrollment has fallen every year since; and the district still faces a structural deficit of roughly $45.9 million. In March 2026 it voted to close another school, Rhodes Middle, that its own 2023 review had rated safe. TPR · SAISD · KSAT

And there is a Portland connection. Before that vote, San Antonio commissioned an equity audit from Dr. Terrance Green and Dr. Havala Hanson, the same researchers PPS later hired to review its own last consolidation. They found that students from San Antonio's previous closures had higher absence rates and lower grades than matched peers, that the receiving schools were academically no better than the ones closing, and that most staff experienced the process as a "done deal." Their report reached the district three days before the board voted to proceed. SAISD equity audit (Nov 2023) PPS then hired the same team. In Portland they found that students fared better than in San Antonio, but that the process did similar damage to trust, and they issued similar warnings (see "PPS's own audit").

The same number, everywhere. San Antonio drew its line at 350 elementary students; Denver called 350 "sustainable"; Seattle used the state's 400-student model school; PPS uses 360. In none of them did that number decide which schools closed (building condition, location, and enrollment patterns did), and in none was it tied to student outcomes.

So why hold these districts up at all? PPS chose them as models for how to run this process, and has not told the board or families what happened after those processes ran. The board should ask, before December 15, whether staff reviewed those results, and if they did, why they weren't presented.

PPS's own audit of the last consolidation: students held steady, trust didn't#

In 2026 PPS commissioned an independent Equity Audit Evaluation of its last enrollment-balancing effort (the Southeast Guiding Coalition, or SEGC, 2020–23) from Dr. Terrance Green (University of Texas at Austin) and Dr. Havala Hanson, and posted it on its own rightsizing page. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation SEGC redrew boundaries, reconfigured grades, and moved programs rather than closing schools outright, so it isn't a perfect preview of rightsizing. But it is the best local evidence there is, and it cuts both ways.

  • Students mostly held steady, and some groups gained. Compared with similar students elsewhere in PPS, students at SEGC schools "showed similar patterns across most academic and behavioral outcomes," and the auditors found no evidence of "broad measurable academic or behavioral harm." Several groups showed small reading gains, including elementary students, students at high-poverty schools, multilingual learners, and students in dual-language programs. Black students showed the largest gain in the first year, though it "was not statistically significant in 2024–25 and did not hold under" a second test. The auditors cautioned that these are "small to medium-sized associations rather than evidence that SEGC produced large systemwide gains."
  • The middle-school promise didn't pay off. "No significant academic differences are associated with SEGC changes among middle school students," which the auditors called "important because SEGC's rationale included improving access to robust middle school experiences."
  • Special-education needs were under-planned. The affected schools ended up serving more students in special education than projected (about 5% more on average), and staff described "trying to implement an inclusive neighborhood model without enough paraeducator and special education support." The auditors' conclusion: staffing "must account for actual student needs and not just enrollment numbers alone."
  • Trust collapsed. "Only 3% of staff survey respondents mostly or completely trust the district to handle rightsizing fairly. More than 50% responded that they do not trust the district at all."
  • People felt the outcome was pre-decided. "Perceptions of predetermined outcomes deeply undermined trust", and members concluded "their recommendations were symbolic, constrained, or easily overridden."
  • The costs fell on staff of color and on some communities. In 2022–23, "39% of Staff of Color at SEGC schools left their schools, compared with 21% at non-SEGC schools," and 18% left PPS altogether, against 10% elsewhere. Part of that came from moving dual-language programs, and by 2024–25 the rate had returned to normal, but "the implementation year produced a real loss of Staff of Color." At one school converted to whole-school dual-language, "Black students were almost entirely displaced": the school's share of Black students "dropped from 10% to 2%." Staff described supporting families while "flying blind."

The recommendations read as a direct warning to the current plan: future closures and consolidations "need clearer goals, firmer scope, and more honest discussion of tradeoffs from the start"; engagement must be "accessible, early, and genuinely influential, not reactive to pre-developed plans"; the district must apply its equity lens "through actual decisions, not just symbolic language"; it should use "projection ranges instead of single enrollment estimates"; and it should "define 'well-resourced schools' through a concrete, funded, and feasible staffing model" before using that phrase to justify closures. Most pointedly: "If a proposed closure, consolidation, or boundary change is intended to create well-resourced schools, PPS should be able to demonstrate not only that enrollment numbers improve on paper, but that students will experience more stable staffing, stronger supports, broader programming, and more equitable access." PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation

In fairness, PPS is right to cite this audit's student results: they are the best local evidence that a consolidation doesn't have to set students back. They are not evidence that this plan, about four times larger and built around closures, will move students forward; the auditors themselves warned against reading them that way. And in staff's written answers to the board, PPS has cited the audit as recommending that a plan for closed buildings be "decided before closure votes, not after." PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19 We could not find that recommendation in either of the audit's two published reports. The same answer says PPS will build its plan for closed buildings "as part of implementation planning," which is to say, after.

What PPS has, and hasn't, made public#

In early October 2026, PPS filled in much of what had been missing. It released a family guide for each of its 81 schools, and those guides now show, school by school, the five-year enrollment estimate (2027-28 through 2031-32), whether the school meets the district's size and space-use goals, an attendance-boundary map, and student-group demographics. That is real progress and worth acknowledging. PPS has also built an interactive rightsizing dashboard, first shared by a board member and now posted on the district's rightsizing site, that adds year-by-year projected enrollment for every school under each scenario, the status-quo baseline behind its scenario claims (only 48% of students in a "sustainable" school by 2031-32 if nothing changes), and district- and region-level displacement figures. PPS rightsizing dashboard But even with all that, the public record stops short of what you'd need to independently check the plan, and six gaps still matter:

  • The raw building capacity. Each family guide says only whether a school meets the 70–100% "space use goal," and some mention a building's capacity in passing (Arleta has "room for 653 students"). PPS family guides The dashboard reports only the share of buildings in that range, by grade level and region. PPS rightsizing dashboard No PPS document we've found lists every building's seat count or utilization rate, so you still can't see how close each call was, or audit the capacity figures the measure rests on. Staff described the method at the October 20 board meeting and said the model would be posted online; until it is, the numbers can't be checked. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting
  • How the projections and thresholds were set. The five-year enrollment estimates and the size goals (360 students for K-5, 500 for K-8 and middle, 1,100 for high school) are published as "planning goals," but not the model, assumptions, or analysis behind them, the same data gap the district's own equity auditors flagged. And the school-level estimates come with no stated margin of error, though Portland State's own track record shows a wide one (see "The enrollment forecast").
  • How many families PPS expects to lose. The dashboard's note on method says PPS moved every neighborhood student to the new school, and PPS hasn't published any rate of loss. Until it does, every receiving school's projected size assumes no family leaves (see "Why families leave"). PPS rightsizing dashboard
  • What happens to the buildings. PPS has published no plan for any building it would close. Its FAQ says a plan will follow board policy on the use or sale of district property, and a spokesperson said decisions about school property will come after the board's final vote. PPS: Rightsize FAQ · Willamette Week, Oct 20 The superintendent has said some closed campuses may serve as swing sites while other schools are renovated, and that she'd prefer to lease others for child care or early learning. The Oregonian, Oct 5
  • What families told PPS. The district's own January 2026 research on why families leave hasn't been published, and its results on redistricting are missing even from the copy released through a records request (see "Why families leave").
  • A definition of success and an independent evaluation. PPS still hasn't said how it will measure whether a closure worked, or committed to an independent review one and three years out.

The equity results PPS highlights (for example, 80% of students in a school that meets the size goal under Scenario A, and 73% under Scenario B) are district- and region-wide totals, and every figure is a projection for the 2031-32 school year, not a current count. (The guides are equally candid that the promised benefits aren't guaranteed; see "the benefits it does promise aren't funded".) PPS scenarios · PPS family guides

These gaps are the strongest, most reasonable thing to press PPS on: before the December 15 vote, release the raw capacity and utilization numbers and the projection method behind the family guides, and commit to an independent one- and three-year evaluation if the plan passes.

PPS's own communications playbook: what leaders are told to say#

In May 2026, PPS's chief of communications at the time, Candice Grose, wrote two documents for the rightsizing process: a 26-page Rightsizing Strategic Communications Plan and a 49-page Rightsizing Strategic Communications Playbook, both marked "Prepared by Candice Grose | Chief of Communications." In October, Memphis-Shelby County Schools named her its chief of communications, Tennessee Tribune and she posted both documents on her portfolio site as work samples; the files are titled "FINAL." Candice Grose: Case Studies As of November 10, the copies she posted no longer load, so the links below go to copies saved for this guide. Plan · Playbook The plan sets out the strategy, timeline, risks, and media approach. The playbook turns it into scripts: guardrails, "Avoid Language Like" lists, and tables of what to say, what people might say back, and the "counter narrative," written separately for central office leaders, board members, principals, and parent and community advocates. (Page numbers below are the ones printed on each page.)

It is built to move the public from "whether" to "how." For the fall, when the superintendent's proposal comes out, the plan's "Critical Focus" is to move the public from "Why are we doing this?" to "How were these recommendations developed?" Plan, p. 9 And it plans for the outcome in advance: "If recommendations are approved: Transition communications must already be operationalized." Plan, p. 3 The "Keep Reinforcing" list printed for every audience includes "Engagement is happening before recommendations are finalized" and "Community voice is part of the process." Playbook, pp. 15, 20, 26, 32 When a reporter asks what happens if the public opposes the recommendations, and pushes, "Will opposition change outcomes?", the scripted answer is that "engagement helps inform both recommendations and implementation planning." Plan, p. 20 It doesn't say yes. That is the shape the public conversation has taken: asked on the radio in October about calls to slow down, the superintendent called the no-closure option a delay, "C just delays the inevitable," and when asked for an example of feedback that had changed her thinking, said it was shaping her final recommendation but that she was "not yet ready" to share specifics. OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16

Organizing is a risk; success is measured in sentiment. The plan's risk table lists "political organizing/opposition" alongside "viral misinformation," "'closed-door decision' narratives," and "equity criticisms." Among the ways to manage them: "message discipline" and "social listening monitoring." Its measures of success are website traffic, "FAQ clicks," "time on page," the "accuracy of coverage, sentiment," "leader preparedness," meeting attendance, and video views. Plan, p. 12 None of them asks whether anything families said changed a recommendation. That is exactly the gap PPS's own auditors found in the last consolidation, where "perceptions of predetermined outcomes deeply undermined trust," and where they told the district that engagement must be "genuinely influential, not reactive to pre-developed plans" (see "PPS's own audit"). In fairness, a risk table is a list of reputational risks to the district; it isn't a plan to suppress anyone.

Board members get the same script as staff. The plan's fourth objective is that board members, the cabinet, principals, and school leaders all operate "from the same strategic message architecture," and "Board talking points" are among its first deliverables. Plan, pp. 3, 9 The playbook's Board Member Talking Guide describes their role as to "reinforce trust, maintain confidence in governance, demonstrate thoughtful stewardship," and to "maintain message discipline." Playbook, p. 19 Its "hallway diplomacy" table scripts what to say in a grocery store, and when a director is "asked to 'pick a side' publicly": "My responsibility is ensuring the process remains thoughtful, transparent, and student-centered." Playbook, p. 24 The board is supposed to oversee the superintendent, and on December 15 it will judge her recommendation. A script written by her staff casts the people who will decide the question as the ones reassuring the public about it. In fairness, directors are free to ignore it, and several have pressed staff hard in public (see "The equity case, checked"). We don't know which directors received the playbook or how they use it.

Parents are recruited as messengers. The Parent & Community Advocate Talking Guide opens by noting that families trust "other parents, community leaders, faith leaders, alumni, culturally specific organizations, and neighborhood advocates before they trust institutions." It says advocates aren't district spokespeople, then hands them the district's lines. Its guardrails tell them not to "predict school outcomes" or "share leaked or unofficial materials," and to avoid saying "The district already made up their mind." When a parent says "This is fake engagement," the scripted reply is that "community feedback is still part of the process before recommendations are finalized." Playbook, pp. 31–33, 36 This is the district-level version of the "This, Not That!" toolkit PPS gave its Village Table parent representatives (see "The same script, city to city").

Its own board script concedes the deficit remains. The playbook's core narrative says rightsizing "sustains and strengthens opportunities over time so resources are not stretched too thin across the system." Playbook, p. 4 But when someone tells a board member "This is just about money," the scripted answer ends: "Even after rightsizing, the district will still face a structural deficit." Playbook, p. 21 That matches the record: the superintendent's planning estimate of what closures save, $11–14 million, is a sixth to a fifth of the $65 million gap (see "What the research and other cities show").

It defines "well-resourced" by staffing. Leaders have defined it by size. The plan's glossary defines a well-resourced school as "a school with strong academic programs, supports, staffing, and opportunities for students," and its scripted answer to a reporter adds "stable staffing." Plan, pp. 13, 20 The playbook is candid about why the phrase was chosen: it "reframes the conversation from loss to access" and "lowers defensiveness." Playbook, p. 6 But the superintendent told OPB that "when we say well resourced, we're saying that we're getting to a size of 360," and the district's headline equity figure counts students in schools above a size line, not staffing (see "What the superintendent told Irvington families"). By the district's own definition, the staffing plan is what would make a school well-resourced, and it hasn't been published.

It never mentions the state. Neither document mentions Salem, the Legislature, the governor, the State School Fund, or the Education Stability Fund. The scripted budget statement begins, "Like many districts across the country, Portland Public Schools is navigating enrollment changes and rising operational costs." Plan, p. 22 Its answer to "Why not wait?" is that "waiting can create greater instability later." Playbook, p. 22 Yet PPS, its board, and its teachers' union have all asked the state to release its school reserve fund. KATU The district's own message strategy leaves out the funding fight it is in, and the playbook has no answer for the ask at the center of this guide: pause until Salem acts (see "What we're asking for").

Openness, then message control. At the March 31 work session, the superintendent told the board: "We've committed to a transparent public deliberation that means that our internal considerations will be shared openly." PPS Board of Education meetings (March 31, 2026 work session) Six weeks later, the playbook told central office leaders not to "share draft documents, maps, or internal conversations." Playbook, p. 15 In fairness, telling staff not to leak drafts protects families from rumors, and the plan praises launching the website early because it "reduces the appearance of secrecy." Plan, p. 24 But some of the internal considerations that would let families check the plan, like a seat count for every building, still aren't public; the 62-page technical methodology PPS posted on November 5 describes its capacity tables without publishing them. PPS: K–8 Scenario Modeling Technical Documentation (See "What PPS has, and hasn't, made public".)

How to use it. When you hear "Community voice is part of the process," ask the question the plan never measures: what in the recommendation changed because of it? Ask your board member whether they received district talking points on rightsizing, and to answer your questions in their own words. And if you file a public-records request, the plan names documents worth asking for: the board talking points, the internal leader toolkit, the stakeholder-specific toolkits, and any social listening reports. Plan, pp. 9, 12

The national network our superintendent belongs to#

Everything else in this guide stands on its own; this section adds context that helps explain the pattern rather than resting the case on it. Portland is following a national model, not setting one. The same move — closing and consolidating schools on enrollment and "sustainability" grounds — is being made city after city by superintendents who trained in and belong to the same national network, funded by the same handful of foundations. That doesn't take a conspiracy; it's what happens when a shared playbook and shared funders meet similar conditions. The fair question for the board is how much of this plan is Portland's own, and how much arrived from the national model.

Portland's plan isn't happening in isolation. Superintendent Kimberlee Armstrong belongs to Chiefs for Change, a national network of district and state education leaders, and completed its "Future Chiefs" leadership program before coming to PPS. Chiefs for Change

The network was founded by former Republican governor Jeb Bush's education foundation, became an independent nonprofit in 2015, and in its earlier years advocated for charter schools and Common Core. K-12 Dive It has around 44 member leaders, mostly big-city superintendents, and is now led by CEO Robert Runcie. Chiefs for Change network

A concrete example of that advocacy: in 2014, Chiefs for Change sent Congress a letter supporting the Success and Opportunity Through Quality Charter Schools Act (H.R. 10), federal legislation to expand charter schools. The letter is on the congressional record. The letter (House Education & Workforce Committee) · About H.R. 10 And that advocacy didn't end when the network went independent: in 2017, its CEO, Mike Magee, named "real access to excellent public school choices" the first of five principles in the group's shared vision. The 74

Taken together, the network's platform has been consistent over time: more charter and virtual schools, broader school choice, and judging schools largely by standardized-test results, including A–F school grades. EdWeek (2010) · the network's own vision (2017)

Its major funders are national philanthropies: Blue Meridian Partners (about $47.6M since 2020), the Bloomberg Family Foundation, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, and the Walton Family Foundation. InfluenceWatch

Put the pieces together and a throughline emerges, the one many education researchers and parent groups point to. The foundations funding this network also bankroll charter schools and "school choice." The method treats a school district like a balance sheet: enrollment thresholds, standardized metrics, and consultant-built scenarios decide which neighborhood schools survive, with communities consulted late and narrowly. And closed public buildings often end up with privately run charters, explicitly so in states like Ohio (see the next section). Critics describe the sum as a slow shift of public education toward private management and technocratic, top-down governance. Portland isn't Ohio (the next section explains why), but it is being run through the same framework by a superintendent trained in the same network.

One fair caveat: Chiefs for Change describes itself as bipartisan, and many members lead Democratic-leaning city districts. What actually ties Portland to the pattern isn't a years-old policy letter but the current record: Portland's own superintendent as a sitting member, shared funders, a shared training pipeline, and a strikingly similar approach showing up city to city, which is the next section.

Further reading on the national-playbook pattern: Armstrong also launched a PPS pilot with Colin Kaepernick's AI company, Lumi, which the board later paused, an example of the public-private AI partnerships Chiefs for Change promotes. OPB

The pattern: closures in other districts#

We went further than a sample. We checked all 37 Chiefs for Change members who run an individual school district: 22 have closed or formally proposed closing or consolidating schools during their tenure, 12 show no such action (several are growing districts building new schools), and 3 more have consolidation studies underway. The full sourced list, every district, leader, status, and link, is in the Closure tally tab. And for all that closing, not one of them can show it worked — across this entire network, we could not find a single district that has published an independent evaluation finding its closures actually delivered, for students or for the budget. A few of the clearest cases:

District Leader (Chiefs for Change) What happened Source
Cleveland Warren Morgan Consolidation plan; ~18 buildings to be emptied Ideastream
Philadelphia Tony Watlington ~20 proposed, 17 approved for closure by 2027 WHYY
Atlanta Bryan Johnson 16 schools to close/repurpose; reported to hit Black communities hardest Atlanta News First
Detroit Nikolai Vitti Several small schools closing Chalkbeat
Indianapolis Aleesia Johnson "Rebuilding Stronger" closures/mergers (2023) Chalkbeat
Chicago (2013) historical cautionary case 50 schools closed in one year under mayoral control NBC Chicago

Important context, in fairness: the network recruits mostly from large urban districts, which are exactly where enrollment is falling fastest. So the pattern reflects shared conditions and a shared playbook as much as any central direction. What's striking is how similar the rationale and rollout look across these districts, and that this superintendent trained inside that network before bringing the same approach here.

The same script, city to city#

It isn't only the same action; it's often the same words. Here is how PPS describes its plan, next to how other Chiefs for Change districts described theirs. The vocabulary, and sometimes the exact framing, recurs. The repeated word is italicized throughout (emphasis added):

"Right-size": the word reframes closing a school as correcting a sizing error, not cutting a service a neighborhood depends on.

  • Portland: calls the whole effort "rightsizing."
  • Cleveland: "takes bold action to right-size, stabilize, and secure a brighter future for CMSD scholars."
  • Jackson: Superintendent Errick Greene's plan: "optimization or right-sizing […] a way of ensuring that we have the optimal resources." Mississippi Free Press

"Sustainable":

  • Portland: "the sustainable use of our school facilities," a system "that is sustainable over time."
  • Cleveland: "a sustainable future for students."
  • Indianapolis: "financial sustainability over time."
  • Boston: "long-term sustainability of BPS."

"Small schools cost more": this is the premise the whole plan rests on — and it isn't Portland's. It's the exact claim of its paid consultant, ERS (see "Where the script comes from").

  • Portland: "Staff and supports spread both unevenly and thin" (its own Sept 1 board deck). As Dr. Armstrong put it, "we're closing schools because we're spreading our resources too thin."
  • Indianapolis: "small, underutilized schools — which cost more, and leave limited dollars for enrichments."
  • Boston: "district resources stretched too thin across too many school communities."

"Stability": the reassurance promises the opposite of what a closure delivers — the disruption of losing your school.

  • Portland: "strengthening stability" and a plan "without requiring students and families to navigate repeated disruptions throughout their K-12 experience."
  • Cleveland: "fewer moves and more stability."

"Equity and access":

  • Portland: "strengthening stability, equity, and access," so that "every student has access to a high-quality education."
  • Cleveland: "more equitable access to strong programs while reducing the district's budget deficit."
  • Indianapolis: "excellent, more equitable choices for learning."

"Hard but necessary decisions":

  • Portland: "The question that I hold onto, though, is what happens if we do nothing?" — Supt. Kimberlee Armstrong.
  • Cleveland: "tough but necessary decisions."
  • Indianapolis: "Doing nothing is not an option — we will go into the red," under the banner "We can do hard things together."
  • Philadelphia: "some of the decisions we have to make will be difficult."

In fairness, some of this is simply the shared vocabulary of school administration, and declining enrollment is a real pressure in all of these cities. But the consistency is the point: the same brand word ("right-size"), the same rationale ("small schools cost more"), the same reassurances ("stability," "fewer disruptions," "equitable access"), surfacing city after city among leaders from the same network. That is what a shared playbook sounds like, and it is exactly what the "we studied this carefully, just for Portland" framing is meant to obscure.

And the script reaches all the way down to Portland's own talking points. You don't have to infer the messaging discipline. The district wrote it down. PPS's Office of Family & Community Engagement convenes a "Village Table" of parent representatives, which it calls "our new districtwide Site Council" and "a space designed to model what inclusive, authentic family input looks like at the central office level." It equips them with a Representative Toolkit of "suggested talking points" and a "This, Not That!" messaging guide. The talking points carry the familiar vocabulary: "well-resourced schools," "greater stability," "more sustainable school sizes." And the district's own September presentation frames the goal as "one standard of opportunity and support" and "opportunity that never depends on your address," an almost exact echo of Chiefs for Change's stated vision of strong schools "regardless of where [students] live or their family's income." PPS Village Table page · Representative toolkit · September presentation

The "This, Not That!" guide is the tell. It coaches parent representatives to replace "PPS is closing 10–15 schools" with "examples of the magnitude of change that may be necessary," and, when a parent says "The district does not care about what I have to say!", to point them to "several engagements throughout September" and a staff liaison rather than engage the complaint. The Village Table's own charter, meanwhile, states it "does not make district decisions" and "does not serve as a substitute for public comment or Board testimony". So here is why this matters for families: the body PPS built to showcase family voice is, by its own terms, not the channel that reaches the Board on the record. The talking points families are handed are the same ones traveling city to city, and the venue handed to them to raise concerns is one the district has defined as non-binding. If you want your objection to count before the December 15 vote, the Village Table isn't the place; Board testimony is. The district-level version of this toolkit, a 49-page playbook of scripts for leaders, board members, principals, and parent advocates, is now public too (see "PPS's own communications playbook").

Where the script comes from: a shared, funded infrastructure#

The advisor behind the "small schools cost more" argument. Education Resource Strategies (ERS) is a national nonprofit consultancy whose core message to districts is that small schools are financially unsustainable: "small schools cost 20-30% more to operate on a per-pupil basis," and leaders should "balance school consolidation with the optimization of small schools" to reach "more sustainable schooling models." ERS That is, nearly word for word, PPS's own rationale. And Portland is an ERS client: through a competitive process (Request for Proposals 2022-002), the PPS board approved a contract with ERS to "develop a strategic resource analysis and plan," at $743,000 for the original term, up to $850,000 through renewals running to March 2025. PPS Board of Education, Resolution 6480 (adopted April 19, 2022) Cleveland, the district whose closure language matches Portland's most closely, was an ERS partner too, though earlier: its 2012–2016 portfolio-model transition preceded its current closures and isn't the same as them. ERS case study So both districts, now speaking in near-identical closure language, had at different points hired the same firm whose "small schools cost more" framing underlies it.

And that premise is written into what Portland paid ERS to do. ERS's own analysis plan for the PPS contract, released through a public-records request, lists among the questions it would answer: "What is the 'size premium' in PPS and how does it compare to other districts nationally? How are small vs. large schools spending their resources differently…" So "small schools cost more" wasn't a conclusion PPS reached and then hired ERS to confirm; putting a number on a small-school "size premium" was in the scope of work from the start, by a firm whose own 2008 report is titled "By Design Not Default: Optimizing District Spending on Small High Schools." PPS public records (RFP 2022-002)

And PPS knew what it was buying. In the same proposal, ERS offers as a credential that it helped another district produce a plan that "closed and consolidated under-enrolled school buildings," and lists "portfolio analysis and redesign (consolidations, grade reconfigurations…)" among its services. The timeline matters: the firm was hired in 2022 — years before any closure scenario was public — to run the resource analysis that fed the plan. That doesn't prove the outcome was fixed in advance, but the direction wasn't discovered by a neutral study; it was set by the choice of a firm whose signature work is closing and consolidating schools. PPS public records (RFP 2022-002)

And this predates the current superintendent. The board approved the ERS contract in April 2022 under Guadalupe Guerrero; Kimberlee Armstrong — a Chiefs for Change member — arrived in 2024 and inherited both the engagement and the plan it fed. OPB So the point isn't about any one leader; it's that the framework was already in motion before she walked in.

The framework. The idea even has a name: the "portfolio" model, which the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), a think tank, credits its founder Paul Hill with having "coined and developed," built around "choice, accountability, and continuous improvement." CRPE CRPE's own page on the model now features a piece titled "Closing schools in a time of enrollment decline," and the model is the source of the "portfolio" language in plans like Boston's.

The toolkits. The approach circulates as ready-made guides. Bellwether's 2025 Navigating Declining Enrollment: A Toolkit for California District Leaders coaches districts on "right-sizing budgets" and rethinking "their portfolio of schools." Bellwether The Keystone Policy Center's 2026 report is titled, literally, Right-Sizing for Student Success, and holds up Cleveland, which "took bold action to right-size and stabilize the district", as a model to copy. Keystone

The money tying it together. The same foundations recur, and it's documented in their own records. ERS's listed philanthropic partners include the Walton Family Foundation, the Gates Foundation, and Carnegie. ERS funders The Walton Family Foundation's own grants database shows years of grants to Chiefs for Change, including $700,000 in 2019 "to build the capacity of and share best practices with education leaders." Walton grants database And Carnegie has funded Chiefs for Change directly, including $600,000 in 2017 "for support of the School and Systems Redesign working group." Carnegie The clearest single thread: the Walton Family Foundation funds both ERS, the advisor whose framing Portland adopted, and Chiefs for Change, the network Portland's superintendent joined.

What this does and doesn't show. It does not prove anyone ordered Portland to close a single school. What it shows is why the plan looks and sounds like everyone else's: Portland is leaning on the same advisor (one it paid), the same framework, and the same toolkits as the other districts, all funded by the same foundations that bankroll the national network its superintendent joined. That is how a national playbook travels without a memo: not by anyone's command, but by shared money and shared ideas converging on the same prescription, the throughline this guide has followed from the start.

Done to North Portland, in the name of improvement#

The case for this plan is that North Portland can't wait, and that doing something is better than doing nothing. North Portland has heard that before. Here is what "something" has looked like.

  • 1970s: integration, one way. PPS desegregated by busing Black students out of Albina and closing the middle grades in their neighborhoods, while white schools went largely untouched. Ron Herndon called it "the most racist form of integration I've ever seen." It took the threat of a boycott by every Black student in the district to change it. Willamette Week
  • 1980s–2000s: a transfer policy that emptied the neighborhood. Open transfers were meant to promote integration. Instead, they let families in gentrifying neighborhoods send their children to whiter, wealthier schools elsewhere; by the late 1990s PPS schools were more segregated than the neighborhoods around them, and the under-enrolled schools left behind lost resources and became closure targets. LSE US Centre
  • Mid-2000s: the K-8 conversions, the closest parallel to today. Facing declining enrollment and, in the superintendent's words, a "way-reduced-resource moment," PPS merged elementary and middle schools into K-8s. They landed mostly in North and Northeast Portland and other lower-income communities; the west side kept its middle schools, and the electives and programs that came with them. Superintendent Carole Smith later said the conversions were done "too quickly without planning." Willamette Week (2015) Families then waited years for the middle schools to come back, Willamette Week (2016) and Tubman reopened as a middle school only in 2018. KATU
  • 2012: closed with little warning. The board closed Humboldt Elementary and the Harriet Tubman girls' academy in North and Northeast Portland, with parents saying they had no real chance to respond. KATU
  • 2020s: the last consolidation. At one school PPS converted to whole-school dual-language, the share of Black students fell from 10% to 2%, by PPS's own audit. PPS: SEGC Equity Audit Evaluation

And now. Under either scenario, a third of North Portland's K-8 students change schools, the highest share in the city, including 39% of its multilingual learners. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting Spanish-immersion students from Beach and James John would be sent across the city to César Chávez, and James John families told a board member that whole-school dual-language for North Portland "felt like 'defacto segregation.'" PPS: Board Q&A document, Oct 19 Immersion families elsewhere in the city describe the same fear of being uprooted. Under both scenarios, Spanish immersion from Beach, James John, and Sitton would consolidate at César Chávez, and the middle-school programs at César Chávez and Ockley Green would move to George in St. Johns. One Southeast parent told KGW that gathering Spanish-immersion families at fewer campuses amounts to "handing ICE a free reign" to find them, and that families she knows are afraid to say so publicly. A Vietnamese-immersion parent, whose community largely arrived as refugees, said moving their program would reopen the trauma of being "separated and relocated." KGW

The pattern isn't bad intentions. It's that big reorganizations, done fast, in lean years, keep landing on the same neighborhoods, and the district keeps learning the cost afterward. The improvements that did last, the 1980 investment in Albina schools and the middle schools that came back in 2018, came after North Portland families organized and pushed. (See "Portland has stopped closures before".)

Portland has stopped closures before#

This isn't the first time Portland families have faced school closures. When they organized across neighborhoods and kept up the pressure, the board has backed down, and when the money ran out, Portland has gone and found more. Both halves of that history matter now.

The Black United Front, 1979–1982

It started with who carried the burden. In the 1970s, PPS desegregated by busing Black students out of North and Northeast Portland and closing the middle grades in their neighborhoods, while white schools went largely untouched. Ron Herndon called it "the most racist form of integration I've ever seen." In July 1979, the Black United Front, an alliance of 15 Albina churches, the NAACP, and eight neighborhood associations, called on all 7,400 of the district's Black students to boycott school that fall, with alternative schools ready for anyone who stayed out. By the end of August, the district had given in to most of its demands. When reforms stalled, the Front staged a one-day boycott in April 1980; new board members elected that spring fired the superintendent in June. Willamette Week The 1980 desegregation plan that followed promised investment in Albina schools and a new middle school. LSE US Centre

1982: the board broke that promise, and paid for it. On March 5, 1982, a reshaped board voted 5–2 to put the new Harriet Tubman Middle School in the Boise building instead of the Eliot site it had promised, closing the last K-8 school in Portland's Black community and scattering its 350 students to five other schools. Two new members provided the margin, over the objection of the district's own superintendent, Matthew Prophet. Public History PDX · Portland Observer (Apr 15, 1982) What followed made governing impossible:

  • The meetings stopped working. About 150 protesters chanting "Eliot, Eliot" filled the next board meeting until the board adjourned and went home. The chair then moved a meeting into a small room closed to the public, which three of his own colleagues called a violation of the open-meetings law. Portland Observer (Apr 15, 1982)
  • The city saw it. More than 500 people marched from Alberta Park, Public History PDX and parents kept their children home in a one-day boycott on April 19. Portland Observer (Apr 8, 1982)
  • It got personal. The Front picketed outside the home of Dean Gisvold, the director who had moved the Boise plan. Portland Observer (Apr 8, 1982)
  • The board tried the courts, and backed off. Directors planned to meet with lawyers about injunctions against protests at board meetings, Portland Observer (Apr 22, 1982) and filed suit on April 20. The next day they put it aside for mediation. Public History PDX

The community set the terms of the talks. The Front agreed to mediation only if the board said it was willing to reconsider, dropped the injunction while talks ran, started by April 26, and decided by May 10. Prophet urged the board to accept, and it did. A mediator from the U.S. Justice Department ran the sessions, with Herndon, the Urban League, and the Albina Ministerial Alliance across the table from Prophet and two directors, one of whom had voted for Boise. Portland Observer (Apr 29, 1982) In May the board voted 6–1 to put Tubman at Eliot after all. Herndon called it a victory for the parents who kept their children home and the groups that rallied, boycotted, and demonstrated, and said the closed-door sessions had let people stop protecting their public images. Portland Observer (May 13, 1982) That is the pattern: pressure that made the status quo untenable, and a way for the majority to change course without simply surrendering.

Tubman still matters to this fight. Since 2018, it has been the middle school for Irvington, Sabin, King, and Boise-Eliot/Humboldt; two of them, Irvington and Sabin, are on today's closure list. KATU

The Jefferson cluster: closed more than anywhere else

North Portland's Jefferson cluster, the schools that feed what was Oregon's only majority-Black high school, has absorbed closure after closure. In 2010, a board majority moved to close Jefferson High itself; hundreds of mostly Black supporters filled the boardroom, Portland Mercury and the building stayed open, though as a college-focused magnet school rather than a full neighborhood high school. American School & University In April 2012, the board voted to close Humboldt Elementary and, 5–2, the Harriet Tubman girls' academy, with parents saying they had no real chance to respond. KATU

So when PPS proposed more closures and mergers there in early 2013, families were ready. They pointed out that the district had closed more Jefferson-cluster schools in a decade than in every other cluster combined, and that the district's transfer policy let families send their children to schools elsewhere, then cited the emptier buildings left behind as the reason to close them. About 200 people rallied at Jefferson in January under signs reading "Stop racist school closures." Portland Observer (Jan 30, 2013) Families and educators packed a February 9 board hearing, where speakers demanded a moratorium on closures, PPS: Feb 9, 2013 hearing minutes and the teachers' union president apologized for not joining parents sooner. On February 12, the superintendent's revised recommendation closed no neighborhood school. Organizers credited one thing above all: they refused the district's attempt to divide them by race and class. The Indypendent · Socialist Worker

The demand those families made, a neighborhood middle school, came true four years later, when the board reopened Tubman as a middle school for North and Northeast Portland. KATU Today, Scenario A closes four more schools in the Jefferson–Roosevelt region. Jefferson–Roosevelt regional summary North Portland is on the list again.

Other cities, and the money

Peer cities have stopped closures recently. Oakland's board voted in 2022 to close or shrink 11 schools; after a year of walkouts, sit-ins, and a hunger strike, three seats changed hands in the November election, and in January 2023 the new board rescinded the closures still to come. EdSource San Francisco dropped its closure plan in October 2024, after the superintendent resigned amid backlash from families and city leaders. EdSource Seattle cancelled its plan once the savings shrank (see "The districts PPS chose as models").

Portland has also raised the money before. In 2003, with state cuts threatening to cost Portland one in five of its teachers, Multnomah County voters passed a temporary 1.25% county income tax, about three-quarters of it for schools. Multnomah County · NW Labor Press In 2019, more than 20,000 Oregon teachers walked out, about 25,000 people rallied in Portland, and five days later the Legislature passed the Student Success Act, roughly $1 billion a year for schools from a tax on large businesses. NW Labor Press · OPB

What the wins had in common

  • A coalition too broad to split. The Black United Front was churches, the NAACP, and neighborhood associations together; the 2013 families refused to be divided by race and class. A fight school against school is a fight the district wins.
  • Pressure that didn't let up. Boycotts, packed meetings, and marches made business as usual impossible, for weeks, not one night.
  • Consequences at the ballot box. Portland voters replaced board members in 1980; Oakland's did in 2022.
  • A way for the board to back down. In 1982, the community set the terms of mediation, and the majority changed course without having to concede in public.

What we're asking for#

The enrollment decline is real. The $65 million gap is real. Neither one is fixed by closing schools: the only savings figure PPS has offered, an estimate the superintendent presented once and hasn't backed up, is $11–14 million, a sixth to a fifth of the gap, and PPS hasn't said whether that recurs (see "What the research and other cities show"). The problem is in Salem, and that's where the fight belongs.

A pause is not the status quo. PPS presents its choice as Scenario A, Scenario B, or the "status quo," PPS scenarios as if anyone opposing closures is defending things as they are. Nobody here is. Families, educators, and the board agree the current system is failing too many students, and that the money to fix it has to come from the state. A pause buys time to pull every other lever first. In Portland: a staffing plan the public can check, and budget choices that protect students first, like the $13.2 million for school-based staff Director Stephanie Engelsman tried to restore in June. Willamette Week In Salem: the reserve fund and the 2027 budget. Debating how many schools to close, 14, 11, or six, accepts the premise that closing schools is the answer. It isn't. That's an invitation as much as a demand: the board has already asked Salem for the same money we're fighting for, even though PPS's own communications playbook never mentions the state (see "PPS's own communications playbook"). Stand with families in Salem, rather than closing neighborhood schools to cover for the state.

Here is what we're asking for, in order.

1. Now: pause the vote. The board should postpone any closure vote until after the 2027 Legislature sets the state school budget. That isn't a stalling tactic; it's the district's own logic. The superintendent says the staffing and class-size numbers can't be firm until the state sets its school fund, OPB: Think Out Loud, Oct 16 the board's own chair has called the deficit "an emergency" that the state's reserve fund exists to prevent, KPTV and the state's Quality Education Commission has told lawmakers schools need billions more, setting up the 2027 session's biggest fight. KATU A closed school doesn't reopen when the money arrives. Make the irreversible decision after Salem answers, not before. Gov. Tina Kotek has said much the same. In an October 13 letter to the superintendent and board chair, she stopped short of asking PPS to withdraw its plans but wrote that "taking the time to get this right is not a delay in making difficult decisions." OPB, Oct 14

What a pause means, and what it costs. A pause isn't open-ended. The Oregon Constitution limits the Legislature's 2027 session to 160 days; the last such session ran from January 17 to June 25. Oregon Legislature: 2023 Oregon Laws, foreword We're asking the board to decide by fall 2027, once two things have happened: the Legislature has set the 2027-29 state school budget, and PPS has published what this guide shows is still missing: the staffing plan, how many families it expects to lose, the seat counts behind building capacity, a plan for each building it would close, and a savings analysis that shows its work (see "What PPS has, and hasn't, made public"). Deciding then has a cost, and we should say so plainly: no closure could take effect before fall 2028, a year later than PPS plans. By PPS's own estimate, which it hasn't backed up, closing schools in 2027 would spare the equivalent of about 76 to 97 school positions from the 2027-28 cuts. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting That estimate is as unproven when it argues for speed as when it argues for savings, and the $65 million in cuts arrives in 2027-28 either way. So the year should come with protection for the schools that can least afford it: the board should publish where the 2027-28 cuts would fall, school by school, and keep them from landing disproportionately on Title I schools.

2. Next: release the Education Stability Fund. Oregon holds about $1 billion in its school rainy-day fund, last tapped for $400 million in 2019-21. OPB It can be released when revenue falls short or when the governor declares an emergency. Willamette Week PPS, its board, its teachers' union, and the state school boards association have all asked for it. KATU · OSBA The board and the families fighting this plan agree on this. Use that: ask every candidate for governor and the Legislature, before and after the November 3 election, whether they will release it.

3. Lasting: fund schools properly, and change how Oregon pays for them. As PPS's student board representative told lawmakers this year, the state has not once fully funded its own Quality Education Model, the same model PPS borrowed its 360- and 500-student lines from. KATU Closing buildings to fit an underfunded budget only locks the underfunding in. The 2019 walkout shows organized families and educators can move new revenue through Salem in a single session.

Part of that fix doesn't need new money: hold virtual schools to the same standards as every other public school, and pay them closer to what they cost to run. Oregon's virtual charters draw state school funding per student while running with no buildings, no buses, and far larger classes, and a 2017 Secretary of State audit made 15 recommendations for overseeing them, none of which the Department of Education had fully carried out by the follow-up a year later. A former education adviser to two governors says the state board or the governor could act by administrative rule or executive action, without waiting for the Legislature. Willamette Week / Oregon Journalism Project, Nov 3 That would leave more of the State School Fund for every other school, Portland's included. Today, 1,118 students who live in PPS's boundaries attend a virtual charter run by another district (see "Why families leave"). PPS has made this argument before: in 2015, its government-relations office backed a bill to move oversight of large virtual charters from local districts to the state. PPS Government Relations: HB 3151 testimony (2015)

How we get there:

  • One demand, citywide. No school's survival should be bought with another's. We reject any version of this plan that trades Irvington for Peninsula or Southeast for North. The 2013 organizers won by refusing that split; so can we (see "The equity case, checked").
  • Every vote on the record. Four of the seven board seats are on the ballot in May 2027, Ballotpedia and at least one director has said she won't run again. Willamette Week Whether or not a director runs again, a vote to close 11 to 14 schools before the state has answered will be the defining vote of their public life. Families will remember it, and so will every future ballot it appears next to. That's how Oakland's reversal happened.
  • Show up, in numbers. Testify at the November 18, November 19, and December 1 listening sessions, and fill the room on November 17 and December 15 (see "Key dates"). Then take the same message to Salem in January.

Questions worth asking#

Whether you're a parent, a neighbor, or a board member weighing this, these questions hold up regardless of where you start:

  • Transparency: Will PPS release the raw capacity and utilization numbers and the projection method behind the family guides (the part the recommendations actually rest on) before the December 15 vote?
  • Forecast uncertainty: Portland State's school-level forecasts have typically missed by about 10% six years out, and 16 schools sit within 10% of the size lines in 2031-32. Will PPS publish a range for each school's projection, and show which closure decisions would change within it?
  • Families who leave: The dashboard assumes every neighborhood student follows their school. What loss did PPS actually model, as the superintendent says it did, and will it publish the percentages before the vote?
  • Class size, in writing: Will the staffing plan promised for early November state the class sizes and staffing ratios at each receiving school, and will the district commit to a class-size cap before the board votes?
  • Why families leave: Will PPS publish its full January 2026 family survey, including the redistricting questions, and explain how the plan responds to the reasons families gave for leaving?
  • Students with disabilities: The special-education parent group SEPTSA has asked PPS for a school-by-school analysis of how each scenario affects students with disabilities, including whether each receiving school has the rooms and staff to serve them, and for a public presentation of it at least a week before the vote. Will PPS provide both? SEPTSA: Special Education Impacts and Information Requests
  • Accountability: Will the district commit to an independent evaluation at one and three years, so we'll actually know whether the closures delivered for students and for the budget?
  • Lessons from the models: PPS studied San Antonio, Seattle, and Denver as models for this process. Did staff review what happened in those districts after their closure decisions, and if so, why weren't the results presented to the board?
  • Savings, net: Will PPS publish what Denver did: the gross savings, how much of that simply follows students to their new schools, and the net amount actually left to "reinvest"?
  • Where the cuts land: Where would the 2027-28 cuts to schools fall, school by school, with closures and without, and how many at Title I schools?
  • What changed? PPS's communications plan measures success by web traffic, sentiment, and attendance. What in the superintendent's recommendation changed because of what families said, and will PPS show it, school by school?
  • Board talking points: PPS's communications plan lists "Board talking points" among its first deliverables. Have directors received district-written talking points on rightsizing, and will PPS publish them?
  • How much is ours? How much of this plan originated in Portland, versus the national model this superintendent trained in through Chiefs for Change?
  • Equity in practice: Why do North and Southeast Portland, and the dual-language programs serving multilingual families, carry most of the closures and program break-ups, while the west side loses far fewer?

Key dates & how to get involved#

  • Oct 15 (Thu): "Sip and Spill" with Superintendent Armstrong at Irvington (after morning arrival). A chance to ask questions directly.
  • Oct 17–29: Board "Community Connections" on rightsizing around the district (McDaniel, Lincoln, Cleveland/Marshall campus, and virtual). PPS rightsize calendar
  • Nov 18, Nov 19 & Dec 1: Board of Education Public Listening Sessions: formal testimony before the vote. Sign up to speak at publiccomment@pps.net.
  • Nov 4: Board meeting where the district reports what it heard in community engagement.
  • Nov 17: Superintendent's final recommendation, with the staffing plan. PPS: Oct 20 board meeting
  • December 15, 2026: Board's scheduled final vote on the scenarios, per district staff on October 20. (Some directors and The Oregonian have cited December 17; check the board calendar before planning around it.)
  • Fall 2027: Changes take effect if approved.

Give feedback: PPS has a rightsizing scenario survey linked from its scenarios page. Public comment sign-up for board meetings goes through the PPS Board page.

Connect with others: Rank-and-file Educators for Democracy (RED) and Labor Notes educators are already organizing against rightsizing, and the Portland Association of Teachers has opposed the closures. You don't have to start from scratch.

The bottom line: the vote isn't until December 15, the numbers behind the plan still aren't fully public, the teachers' union opposes the plan, and Portland has reversed closures before. Showing up, in numbers, at the listening sessions, and in writing, is how that happens again.

Closure tally — Chiefs for Change district leaders#

As of October 2026. These are the 37 Chiefs for Change members who lead an individual school district; the 6 state chiefs and one regional service agency (Puget Sound ESD) are excluded. "Proposed" means an official district plan, board recommendation, or vote — not speculation or rumor. Compiled from each district's local news and board records; network roster.

22 have closed or proposed closing/consolidating schools · 12 no action found · 3 studies underway.

District (state) Leader Status Evidence
Boulder Valley (CO) Rob Anderson Proposed "Resilient Schools" recommendation to close/consolidate (Boulder Reporting Lab)
Portland (OR) Kimberlee Armstrong Proposed Rightsizing plan, up to ~18–20 schools (OPB)
Metro Nashville (TN) Adrienne Battle Closed (2020) North Nashville consolidation, 4 schools (TN Lookout)
Salem-Keizer (OR) Andrea Castañeda Study underway Process that could close up to 8 schools; none named yet (KATU)
Sarasota County (FL) Terry Connor Closed Suncoast Poly / Brookside consolidation (WUSF)
Baltimore City (MD) Jermaine Dawson No 2025 closure proposal predates his July 2026 start (Baltimore Banner)
Arlington (VA) Francisco Durán No Only cautious talk of future consolidation (ARLnow)
Toledo (OH) Romules Durant Closed Edgewater & Mayfair elementaries (Toledo Blade)
Aldine ISD (TX) LaTonya Goffney Closed 6 schools (Houston Landing)
Duncanville ISD (TX) T. Lamar Goree No No proposal found
Jefferson Parish (LA) James Gray Closed ~6 schools consolidated (FOX8)
Jackson (MS) Errick Greene Closed 13 buildings (The 74)
Indianapolis (IN) Aleesia Johnson Closed "Rebuilding Stronger" closures/mergers (Chalkbeat)
Atlanta (GA) Bryan Johnson Closed APS Forward 2040, 16 schools (Rough Draft Atlanta)
Wallingford-Swarthmore (PA) Russell Johnston No No proposal found (short tenure)
Poudre (CO) Brian Kingsley Proposed Closure plan proposed, shelved May 2024 (Colorado Sun)
Dayton (OH) David Lawrence Study underway 2026-27 reconfiguration; no building closure named (Spectrum News)
Prince William County (VA) Latanya McDade Proposed Potomac View Elementary closure recommended (WTOP)
Orange Unified (CA) Rachel Monárrez Study underway Consolidation study; no formal vote (EdSource)
Bernalillo (NM) Matt Montaño No District expanding schools (Rio Rancho Observer)
Cleveland (OH) Warren Morgan Proposed Merger/closing plan announced Nov 2025 (Ideastream)
Reading (PA) Khalid Mumin No Overcrowded / expanding
Guilford County (NC) Whitney Oakley Closed 4 elementaries consolidated (WFDD)
Greeley-Evans (CO) Deirdre Pilch No Growing district, building new schools
Hamilton County (TN) Justin Robertson Closed 3 elementaries consolidated into one (NewsChannel9)
Beaufort County (SC) Frank Rodriguez No No proposal found
Greenville County (SC) W. Burke Royster No Fast-growing; budget cuts only (Fox Carolina)
Everett (WA) Ian Saltzman No Growing; buying land for new school (Herald Net)
Boston (MA) Mary Skipper Closed Frederick MS & West Zone ELC (Boston Globe)
Birmingham City (AL) Mark Sullivan No No closure plan found
Montgomery County (MD) Thomas Taylor Proposed Silver Spring Int'l MS closure recommended, paused (Bethesda Magazine)
Issaquah (WA) Heather Tow-Yick No Adding capacity; no closure (Sammamish Independent)
Orange County (FL) Maria Vazquez Closed 7 schools (Spectrum News 13)
Detroit (MI) Nikolai Vitti Closed 4 schools, more flagged (Chalkbeat)
Philadelphia (PA) Tony Watlington Proposed Facilities plan, ~17 schools (Inquirer)
Plano ISD (TX) Theresa Williams Closed 4 campuses (FOX4)
Little Rock (AR) Jermall Wright Closed "LRSD Forward" consolidations (UALR Public Radio)

How to read this: the point isn't that closing schools is always wrong — it's that this exact move is spreading through one national network, on similar rationales, faster than anyone is checking whether it works.